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I. INTRODUCTION
Financial liability for remediation of polluted sites has been a matter of
widespread public debate, legislation, and litigation in the United States for
many years.' Terms such as "leaking landfill" and "Superfund" are broadly
recognized by the American public, and the retroactive strict liability of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA) has become a familiar feature of the American legal
landscape. This state of affairs is in stark contrast to that in Great Britain. To
date, the British legal system has done very little to address the problem of
financing remediation projects. While this lack of movement can in part be
traced to an apathetic British public,2 such attitudes are changing Plainly
some changes in the British system will have to occur, if only to satisfy
obligations under European Union (EU)4 directives.' This Article proposes
1. The 1978 discovery of the improper disposal of chemical wastes and the resulting contamination
of Love Canal, New York, was "a national media event that crystallized a festering problem in terms that
provoked an emotional response from the public." ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 288 (1992). In response, Congress passed the primary federal
statute regulating the cleanup of existing waste sites, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767
(1980), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. IV 1992)).
2. The House of Commons Environment Committee (HC Committee) quoted a consultant observing,
"The UK public seems remarkably undisturbed by the prospect of living on or close to a polluted
site .... It is notable that the 'environmental lobby' in the UK has not made an issue of old chemical
dump sites next door to, or even under, houses." H.C. ENV'T COMM., ToXIC WASTE, 2D REPORT, H.C.
22, Sess. 1988-89, at lxix [hereinafter HC, ToxIc WASTE]. In one case involving the destruction of a
house by a migrating landfill gas explosion, the HC Committee characterized the peculiarly unconcerned
reaction of local authorities as "a general lack of awareness [that was] a symptom of the ... low status
of waste management." Id. at xxix-xxx.
3. In particular, Friends of the Earth (FoE) has become quite active in pressing the government for
greater public involvement in environmental affairs. See, e.g., EC Directive Not Being Implemented, FoE
Says, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 238, 238 (Mar. 24, 1993) (reporting organization's formal complaint to
EU Commission charging British government with "incorrect implementation of [the] Council
Directive ... on the freedom of access to information on the environment"); see also Environmental
Group Outlines Package of Measures to Address Waste Management, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 263, 263
(Apr. 7, 1993). Industry has also demonstrated increasing concern over environmental deterioration. See
Group Proposes Major Changes in Assessing Pollution Liability, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 264, 265 (May
6, 1992) ("One principal concern is the [Loss Prevention Council's] belief that industrial pollution in the
United Kingdom 'is becoming much worse.'").
4. Since the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, there has been a move to replace the term
"European Community" (EC) with "European Union" (EU). See Foreign Affairs Council: GA7T,
Enlargement and Turkey on November 8-9 Agenda, European Report, Nov. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS,
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a comprehensive program for waste site remediation that applies lessons of the
U.S. experience, along with potential EU obligations, to the existing statutory
and common law framework in Great Britain.
Concern for public health, or, more broadly, the environment clearly
drives initiatives to clean up waste sites. A brief consideration of what lurks
in the shadows, however, reveals a panoply of interrelated and often
conflicting goals. One commentator observes that, depending on
circumstances, the goal of current U.S. law might be
to clean up hazardous waste sites quickly and efficiently so that they do not pose a
significant risk to health and the environment;
* to punish retroactively those who in the past dumped toxic chemicals;
* to create economic incentives to deter others in the future from releasing chemicals
into the environment;
* to reassure communities that their health will be protected;
* to protect resources such as groundwater for future use;
* to restore waste sites to pristine condition; or
* to enforce state and local decisions on the appropriate level of cleanup.6
Other goals could include minimizing the cost to taxpayers, creating the most
easily administered program, and maximizing the effect of scarce cleanup
dollars.
Any attempt to remedy past harms must address causes as well as effects
to avoid a never-ending cycle of pollution and remediation. Therefore,
deterrence of future pollution is as important as restoration of the environment
in the debate on waste site remediation.7 Yet the concurrent pursuit of
deterrence and remediation goals is far from straightforward; measures
strongly advancing one objective may just as thoroughly defeat the other. For
example, a government-funded program to restore environmental damage
promotes timely remediation. However, dispersing the attendant financial
burden through the public purse eliminates any deterrent effect on individual
actors. Conversely, a liability system that emphasizes deterrence through
financial accountability might avoid this trap, but without some provision for
unidentifiable or insolvent polluters, such a system would leave many sites un-
remediated. In addition, the change in traditional liability rules that would be
required to enforce such accountability would divert substantial resources from
Eurcom Library, ECNews File (noting "unspoken agreement between the [member] countries that the old
Community should make way for the European Union"). Here, the more current term European Union
will be used except in historical references and quotations.
5. For a discussion of the evolution and mechanics of the application of EU environmental law to
member states, particularly in the area of waste management, see generally Patrick E. Thieffry & Peter
E. Nahmias, The European Community's Regulation and Control of Waste and the Adoption of Civil
Liability, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 949 (1991).
6. E. Donald Elliott, Superfund: EPA Success, National Debacle?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Winter 1992, at 11, 13.
7. See Philip T. Cummings, NEPA to CERCLA: Completing the Circle, ENVrL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1990,
at 11, 11 (claiming that "main purpose of CERCLA is to make spills or dumping of hazardous substances
less likely through liability").
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cleanup to litigation.' The design of a program to redress waste site pollution
is thus complicated by a need to balance deterrence and remediation goals.
While the debate on environmental restoration often centers on deterrence
and remediation, concerns for public participation are also important. Indeed,
the need "to reassure communities that their health will be protected" and "to
enforce state and local decisions on the appropriate level of cleanup"9
primarily reflects democratic ideals and only indirectly supports deterrence
and remediation goals.
All of this is germane to the British situation. Although little concrete
evidence is available, many factors suggest the existence of a tremendous
number of problem waste sites. Yet the law on waste site remediation liability
is currently in a state of flux in the United Kingdom; Parliament believes that
current British law is inadequate to face the challenge of these newly
discovered hazards. In addition, recent activity in Brussels demonstrates that
forthcoming EU legislation could dramatically change the nature of the waste
management business in the near future.
After outlining the landfill contamination problem in the United Kingdom
(Part II), this Article traces the evolution of the law governing financial
responsibility for the remediation of polluted sites. It focuses on landfill sites
whose operations met the standards of their time, rather than "illegal
dumping,"'" which entails a range of separate issues. This discussion of the
British system addresses both older common law remedies (Part III) and
attempts at statutory reform (Part IV). After identifying EU requirements that
the British are likely to face and U.S. lessons that they should not ignore (Part
V), the Article proposes a program for waste site remediation in the United
Kingdom (Part VI). t'
II. LANDFILL CONTAMINATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom indisputably has a problem with contaminated sites.
One consultant has estimated that as much as US$37.5 billion could be
required to clean up British sites.' 2 Yet perhaps the most often reported fact
8. See infra notes 307-310 and accompanying text for a discussion of the litigation costs associated
with CERCLA.
9. Elliott, supra note 6, at 13.
10. Or, in British, "fly-tipping ... a most pernicious crime." DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, THE
GOVERNMENT'S REPLY To THE 2D REP. FROM THE ENV'T COMM.: ToxIc WASTE, 1989, CMND 679, at
8 [hereinafter DoE, Toxic WASTE].
11. This Article uses the following geopolitical designations: "Great Britain" is "the geographical
name of that island of the British Isles which comprises England, Scotland, and Wales." "United
Kingdom" is the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. England and Wales "form an administrative
entity"; some of the data reported here are specific to that entity. United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, 1992-93 STATESMAN'S Y.B. 1314 (Brian Hunter ed., 129th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
STATESMAN'S Y.B.].
12. DoE Attacked for 'Burying' Reports on Contaminated Land, Dropping Register, 16 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 652, 653 (Sept. 8, 1993) [hereinafter DoE Attacked] (citing DoE-commissioned study
estimating British cleanup costs at US$11.25-$37.5 billion).
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about the British waste management industry is how few facts regarding the
industry are known. 3 For example, virtually no information is available on
the financial stability and the business character of private landfill owners.
Nevertheless, substantial indirect evidence supports a presumption of
significant landfill contamination. Section A below outlines an inadequate and
misdirected British regulatory regime that has shaped the modern industry.
Through a comparison of waste disposal statistics with those of the United
States, where more is known about the damage inflicted by past practices,
Section B illustrates the potential perils of waste mismanagement in Great
Britain.
A. The Regulatory System
British common law has imposed negligible liability for waste site
contamination. t4 Where a tort system does little to reallocate costs, polluters
have few incentives to modify their behavior. As a result, common law
principles have had little impact on Britain's waste management industry.
The British regulatory system, on the other hand, has influenced waste
operations, particularly since the passage of the Control of Pollution Act 1974
(COPA 1974)," 5 which has provided the bulk of legal controls on landfill
management to date.16 Regardless of the magnitude of this impact in general
terms, certain aspects of licensing requirements, operating standards, and
agency morale suggest that many existing sites are environmental hazards.
1. Licensing Requirements
Waste site licensing requirements have done nothing to prevent technically
or financially unqualified parties from opening and operating landfills. COPA
13. See, e.g., H.C. ENv'T CoMM., THE EC DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON THE LANDFILL OF WASTE, 7TH
REPORT, H.C. 263, Sess. 1990-91, at xviii-xix ("[W]e have generally been appalled at the poor standard
and patchy coverage of the statistics on landfill[s]," including information on "site location, size, age,
type, throughput, ownership, and management and monitoring regimes.") [hereinafter HC, DRAFT
DIRECTIVE]; Comprehensive Registers Lacking at Most Municipal Authorities, FoE Charges, 16 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 624, 624 (Aug. 25, 1993) ("[Of 339 local] authorities responding to a request for information
on contaminated land, 34 percent had no information, 44 percent had 'some' information, and 22 percent
were unable to answer the question."). Despite the HC Committee's disgruntlement and the local
authorities' continuing non-performance, the central government is not very concerned with the general
lack of information and "sees little to be gained from putting these lists together, unless there were further
attempts to extend the list into a complete national record of all potentially contaminated sites." DEP'T OF
THE ENV'T, THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE 1ST REP. FROM THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SELECT
COMM. ON THE ENV'T: CONTAMINATED LAND, 1990, CMND 1161, at 4 [hereinafter DOE,
CONTAMINATED LAND]. A compromise intended to address the DoE's concerns by registering
"'contaminative uses' rather than actual pollution" not only limits the utility of the studies, but has been
attacked by developers as "arbitrary and unfairly damaging to property ,alues." Marina Wheeler, The EC
Piece of the Contaminated Land Jigsaw, 136 SoLIC. J. 580, 580 (1992).
14. See infra part III.
15. Control of Pollution Act, 1974, ch. 40 (COPA 1974); see infra text accompanying notes
128, 131-137.
16. HC, DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 13, at xix.
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1974 states that "it shall be the duty of the authority not to reject the
application [for a landfill license] unless the authority is satisfied that its
rejection is necessary for the purpose of preventing pollution of water or
danger to public health. "'7 Although this provision could be read as giving
licensing authorities broad discretion, it has been interpreted as requiring the
local authority to approve a permit application unless it finds fault with the
proposed physical location of the landfill."8 Indeed, this provision
purportedly put beyond the reach of licensing authorities any inquiry into an
applicant's criminal record, let alone its technical capabilities or financial
stability.' 9
The Environmental Protection Act 1990 (EPA 1990)2" used virtually the
same language as COPA 1974, but it added the condition that the authority
may satisfy itself "that the applicant is a fit and proper person. "21 "Fit and
proper person" is defined in terms of past offenses, technical capabilities, and
financial stability,' the first two of which may be further defined by the
Secretary of State.' But the statute does not similarly provide for further
guidance on financial requirements, defined only as "adequate to discharge the
obligations arising from the license.'24 The exact obligations under current
law remain unclear, but to date they have not been extensive. Although EPA
1990 does impose new licensing requirements backed by the threat of site
closure, they amount to nothing more concrete than mandatory consultation
with the National Rivers Authority (NRA)s and initial site inspection by the
local authority, which has also been given the right to demand further
information.26 Nothing in the act indicates that these provisions create a more
vigorous standard of financial stability.
However, the current activity of the European Union concerning civil
liability for environmental damage27 has already brought greater emphasis on
the financial component of "fit and proper."2" Inevitably, many "legitimate"
waste disposal operators will not have sufficient financial backing to satisfy
17. COPA 1974 § 5(3).
18. DoE, Toxic WASTE, supra note 10, at 7. Further, according to COPA 1974, an applicant was
required to obtain planning commission permission, where applicable, before applying to the waste
licensing authority. Such permission provided a presumption of validity that made it even more difficult
for the local authority to refuse permit applications. See COPA 1974 § 5(2)-(3).
19. DoE, Toxic WASTE, supra note 10, at 7-8.
20. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, ch. 43 (EPA 1990); see infra part IV.B.1.
21. EPA 1990 § 36(3).
22. Id. § 74.
23. Id. § 74(6).
24. Id. § 74(3)(c).
25. The National Rivers Authority was established in 1989 to monitor and manage water resources
and water pollution. See infra parts IV.B.2-3.
26. EPA 1990 § 39.
27. See infra part V.A.
28. HC, DRAFr DIREcTIvE, supra note 13, at xxxvi; see also New Regime for Waste Licensing to
Be Introduced in April 1993, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 556, 556 (Aug. 26, 1992) (quoting British
Environment Minister MacLean explaining that "fit and proper" test will be used to examine financial
strength of applicants "in case anything goes wrong and corrective action is required").
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the new requirements. 9 Moreover, as the following section demonstrates,
many of these same operators have none of the technical expertise that could
rescue them from the expenses to come.
2. Operating Standards
Just as lax permit requirements have not barred underqualified operators
from opening facilities, operating standards applied to those facilities have not
prevented environmental contamination. As a result, operators lacking in
expertise often easily meet the technical requirements of their licenses. In
some locales, license restrictions have gone no further than to require that
"disposals be carried out 'to the satisfaction of the Waste Disposal
Authority.'" 3 Even where local authorities are conscientious and adequately
staffed,3 standard "dilute and disperse" operating procedures present a clear
risk of groundwater contamination. 2 Indeed, there is a decided lack of
emphasis on groundwater protection,33 which is at the heart of much U.S.
legislation. 4
In addition, the definition of offense under COPA 1974, which refers to
the "deposit [of] controlled waste on any land, "3  has been interpreted to
mean the actual act of deposition.36 In other words, local authorities consider
their hands tied unless they witness the actual unlawful deposit of wastes. The
House of Commons Environment Committee found that "[i]ntimidation of
29. One study suggests" that as many as 80% of landfill sites will "no longer exist as they currently
stand" under more burdensome landfill closure requirements. HC, DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 13, at
xx.
30. HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, at xxxix.
31. See infra notes 39-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the varying levels of staffing
and capabilities of local authorities.
32. The British expect their landfills to release leachate (a chemical soup of waste liquids,
groundwater, and rainwater) after "biodegradation, and attenuation processes have reduced them to
acceptable concentrations." HC, DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 13, at xx n.4. This is in sharp contrast
to the U.S. conception of containment, which is intended to prevent just such releases. While the House
of Commons Environment Committee was "not convinced that dilute and disperse is an acceptable
principle upon which to base waste management," HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, at xxviii, it also
viewed the U.S. approach as "basically long-term storage," part of a larger system "some aspects of
[which] cannot be justified on scientific grounds." Id. at xxix; see also DOE, Toxic WASTE, supra note
10, at 5 ("Entombment landfill is no more than long term storage.... It is far better to deal with our
waste now ....").
33. This is not to say that there is no evidence of a problem with groundwater contamination. The
Water Authorities Association reported that "large numbers of landfill sites ... cause local contamination
of the groundwater," and, once such contamination has occurred, "it is rarely possible to rehabilitate the
resource." HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, at xxix. Similarly, a consultant stated, with respect to
groundwater pollution, "Essentially if we look for it in an urban or industrialised area, and indeed in some
rural areas, we will find it." Id. app. at 571 (submission of Clayton Bostock Hill & Rigby Ltd.).
34. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, H. REP. No. 1016(I), 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6122 [hereinafter INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE COMM. REPORT].
35. COPA 1974 § 3(1)(a).
36. HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, at xlii.
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Inspectors to keep off a site when unloading takes place is not unknown."37
Even where Waste Disposal Authorities (WDA) hope to prosecute, they often
report difficulty in convincing the local authority solicitors to proceed. 8
3. Agency Efficacy
Inconsistency and lack of enthusiasm in agency action also present a
persistent problem. At the local level, there is no "typical" Waste Disposal
Authority. The offices vary from "literally a man and a dog... [to]
authorities which have a team of multi-disciplinary staff."'" Agency activity
varies to such an extent that disposal market distortion occurs where tightly
regulated districts abut those with a less active WDA.4" In other words, sites
in some districts are so strictly regulated, with resulting expenses so high
relative to those in neighboring jurisdictions, that noticeable shifts in
patronage have occurred. The decade long failure of nearly seventy percent
of all local WDAs to submit waste disposal plans to the Secretary of State as
required by COPA 1974 provides further evidence of a lack of organization
at the local level.4 '
The dual role of some local authorities as operators and regulators
compounds the problem of agency inefficiency. A significant number of
sites - between fifteen and twenty-five percent - are owned by local
governments. 42 Some "regulators" have been found to be "particularly lax
in dealing with the sites which they themselves operate. "41
On the national level, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP) is
charged with reporting on the performance of the local WDAs. 4 HMIP was
formed in 1987 as a combination of the former Industrial Air Pollution
Inspectorate, Radiochemical Inspectorate, and Hazardous Waste Inspectorate,
and is a part of the DoE.45 Despite its broad range of responsibilities, HMIP
is primarily known for its understaffing and low morale,46 and has been
accused of being "captured" by industry.47 Outside of its monitoring reports,
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at xli (citing studies by Institute of Wastes Management).
40. Id. at xl.
41. HC, DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 13, at xix; see COPA 1974 § 2 (requiring preparation and
revision of waste disposal plans).
42. HC, DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 13, at xviii.
43. HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, at xli (quoting Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution
(HMIP)); see infra part IV.B. 1.a.
44. DoE, ToxIc WASTE, supra note 10, at 5.
45. DAVID HUGHES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 61 (2d ed. 1992).
46. Id. at 62; see also HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, at xlii-xliii; Environment Unit Criticized
for Effort to Prepare Business for Pollution Controls, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 232, 232 (Apr. 24,
1991).
47. See HUGHES, supra note 45, at 62.
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HMIP has had little impact on waste management. 4' Although EPA 1990
could result in a larger regulatory role for HMIP, 49 such a change will be
resisted by the DoE, which is perfectly satisfied with the status quo."0
B. Waste Disposal Statistics
The regulatory shortcomings outlined above - lax licensing and operating
standards and agency inefficiency - hint that landfill contamination poses an
environmental problem in the United Kingdom. A brief comparison of UK
waste generation statistics to those from the United States, where much more
is known about the potential costs of remediation, 5" confirms that fear.2
Consider the following data:
Population Density and Waste Generated Relative to Landmass 3
Population Municipal Waste Industrial Waste
(1000s) (/km2) (k-tonnes) I (t/kn 2) (k-tonnes) (t/kin2)
UK 56,9004 235 35,0001s  145 50,00056 207
England & 48,968 7  324 17,70056 117 N/A -
Wales
U.S. 249,200- 27 208,8006 23 760,00056 83
These data show that population density in the United Kingdom is
48. In 1987-88, 342 pollution complaints to HMIP resulted in two prosecutions; in 1988-89, HMIP
pursued four prosecutions, none of which involved waste disposal. Id.
49. See id.
50. The DoE has stated that it is "unaware of any comparable body in other Western countries which
issues regular reports on just how legislation has been applied. It is a reasonable assumption that much
more is known publicity [sic] about the achieved standards of waste management in the UK than in most
other countries." DoE, Toxic WASTE, supra note 10, at 5. In addition, critics have skeptically viewed
recently announced plans to form a new "Environment Agency" by combining HMIP, the National Rivers
Authority, and the local WDAs as budget-cutting rather than enforcement-enhancing measures. Government
Announces Intention to Create New Environment Agency After 1995, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 898, 899
(Dec. 1, 1993) (quoting FoE campaigns director Andrew Lees).
51. See infra part V.B.
52. This comparison is useful because of the lack of information available on British landfills, see
supra note 13, and is valid because of the parallel industrial development of the United Kingdom and the
United States, see DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 226 (1986) (noting earlier industrial development in Great
Britain relative to United States). In addition, the structure of the waste management industry with respect
to private versus public sector owners/operators is similar in both countries. DoE, Toxic WASTE, supra
note 10, at 4. In contrast, waste disposal on the continent is predominantly a public sector activity. Id.
53. The area figures used in these calculations are as follows: 151,000 km2 for England and Wales,
STATESMAN'S Y.B., supra note 11, at 1314; 242,000 km2 for the United Kingdom, OECD, THE STATE
OF THE ENVIRONMENT 96 (1991) [hereinafter OECD, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT]; and 9,167,000 km
for the United States, id.
54. OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS: A PRELIMINARY SET 65 (1991) [hereinafter OECD,
PRELIMINARY SET]. Figures are for 1990.
55. Id. at 74. The magnitude of this number relative to the figure given for England and Wales
indicates the definitional problems that affect this data.
56. Id. at 45. Figures are per annum for the late 1980's.
57. STATESMAN'S Y.B., supra note 11, at 1314. The population given is for 1991.
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approximately ten times greater, and its waste generation per unit land mass
from 2.5 to 6 times greater, than those of the United States." A significant
majority of the waste produced in the United Kingdom is disposed of to land.
Recent estimates range from nearly eighty percent for hazardous wastes59 to
eighty-eight percent for municipal solid waste." This has resulted in, by one
estimate, over three thousand operational and six thousand "completed"
landfill sites.6  Some of these sites clearly "would be regarded as 'problem
sites' requiring urgent action in . . . the USA."6 2 At the same time, an
estimated half of all new building occurs on "recycled" land,63 much of
which is not subject to adequate environmental assessment prior to
redevelopment. 4
Regardless of recordkeeping discrepancies that render detailed
comparisons impossible,65 the magnitude of the landfill contamination
problem in the United States bodes ill for the United Kingdom. The exact
impact in the United States is a matter of great debate, but by all accounts
ranges from very large to mind-boggling. Some recent estimates of the
aggregate cost of all U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) programs
for environmental cleanup exceed $1 trillion,66 or more than $100,000 for
every square kilometer of U.S. landmass. The British face potentially
staggering landfill cleanup costs as well.
In sum, the regulatory structure of waste management in Great Britain has
allowed industry to evolve to a point where a large number of participating
businesses are financially unstable, technically unqualified, and generally
unknown quantities, both to local regulatory authorities and to national
overseers. Waste management standards, where applied at all, have
presumably allowed the pollution of groundwater through a "dilute and
58. As an aside, the rates of public land protection (i.e., scientific reserves, national parks, natural
monuments, nature reserves, and protected landscapes) in the United States (8.6%) and the United
Kingdom (10.6%) were so close in 1989 as to be indistinguishable. OECD, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 53, at 101.
59. HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, app. at 66 (submission of Water Authorities Association).
60. HC, DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 13, at xvii tbl. 1.
61. Id. at xviii. More recent reports place the number of locations failing under the broader
classification "contaminated sites" at up to 100,000. DoE Attacked, supra note 12, at 652.
62. HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, app. at 561 (submission of Clayton Bostock Hill & Rigby
Ltd.).
63. Id. app. at 562.
64. Cf. DoE Attacked, supra note 12, at 653 (noting resistance to use of "contaminated land
registers" as means of assessment specifically because of "the high level of urbanization, industrialization,
and home ownership").
65. The OECD cautions that its data should be interpreted with the understanding that national
definitions of waste categories, which vary considerably, were used in preparing its publication. OECD,
PRELIMINARY SET, supra note 54, at 44. In particular, the U.S. figures for industrial waste include
"wastewaters managed in land-based operations." Id. at 73; cf. supra note 55. However, the over-
inclusiveness of the U.S. data reinforces the point of this section that potential British problems with
leaking landfills are most likely at least as bad as known U.S. problems.
66. See THOMAS W. CHURCH & ROBERT T. NAKAMURA, CLEANING UP THE MESS:
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES IN SUPERFUND 3 (1993).
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disperse" regime.67 These "requirements" are further relaxed in as many as
one-quarter of all landfills where the regulator itself owns the site. 68 In
addition, the "low status of waste management"69 has resulted in widely
varying local enforcement and a deeply demoralized national watchdog. All
of this has occurred in an industrialized society where even a cursory survey
of waste statistics indicates a potential for trouble.
m. COMMON LAW REMEDIES
Despite government pronouncements to the contrary," British common
law affords little opportunity to redress environmental harms. In particular,
it has established no liability rules that might induce private firms to "police"
waste disposal sites, even in the face of gross agency neglect.7 The classic
common law tort is exemplified by a motorist running down a pedestrian, or
a thoughtless landowner who has erected a dam on his property and thereby
flooded his neighbor's land. Such cases, where both the perpetrator and the
victim are easily identified and limited in number, fall neatly into a one-
plaintiff, one-defendant pattern. The basic nature of the harm - and often
even the cause of the harm - is well established, and remedies are easily
administered in the form of damages and injunctions. The common law courts
developed in this setting, and the rules they developed address such cases
efficiently.
Issues of waste site remediation rarely fit into so neat a pattern. The
discovery of harm may occur years after the precipitating act. Indeed, the
issue of whether a remediable harm has even occurred may be hotly
contested. Defendants may or may not be known or knowable; conclusively
determining the group of all potential plaintiffs likewise may be impossible.
In addition, the technical complexity of appropriate remedies is often far
beyond the competence of courts. To some extent, the British Parliament has
addressed these shortcomings in statutes supplanting or augmenting common
law actions. Still, regardless of its limitations, the common law remains
important in areas not covered by statutes.7'
67. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
69. HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, at xxx.
70. See, e.g., Minister Hits Out at 'Over-Arching' Green Paper on Green Liability, EC ENERGY
MONTHLY, Oct. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, ECNews File [hereinafter Minister Hits
Out] (reporting UK Environment Minister's assertion that "UK had a broadly correct framework for civil
liability in place").
71. See Industry "Il-Prepared'for System to Regulate Waste, Business Official Says, 15 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 240, 240 (Apr. 22, 1992) [hereinafter Industry 'll-Prepared ("The duty of care is not a new
concept .... [b]ut waste is a totally new context."); HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, at lxi (noting that
"less than five percent of all customers ... mainly the major waste generators and particularly, but not
exclusively, those of American parentage" actually "checked" the waste facilities they used); cf. supra part
II.A.3.
72. Allen & Overy, Environmental Liabilities: The Lender's Perspective 26 (1991) (unpublished
advisory memorandum on file with author).
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Common law environmental liabilities have been loosely grouped under
three categories: negligence, nuisance, and the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.3
A. Negligence
Negligence is "the failure to exercise that care which the circumstances
demand." 74 Proof of negligence for environmental harms requires a claimant
to demonstrate (1) that the polluter owed him a duty of care; (2) that the
polluter breached the standard of care imposed by that duty; (3) that the
damage that occurred was in fact caused by the breach of the duty; and (4)
that it was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the breach. 5 Because of
the difficulty of establishing each of these elements, negligence is the least
useful legal action in environmental litigation.76
Although a landowner's duty of care to others extends beyond a duty to
neighboring landowners,' most negligence cases involving harm to land are
brought by the owners of impaired adjacent property. In such cases, courts
have found "a measured duty of care by occupiers to remove or reduce
hazards to their neighbours."78 While this duty applies regardless of whether
the hazard is natural or man-made,79 in practice it has often been reduced to
nil.8
0
Even where a duty of care is established, it can be impossible to establish
a breach of the standard of care, now defined as "an unreasonable failure to
achieve the standard of care required by law."" t In determining this
standard, courts may take into account the cost and difficulty of avoiding the
harm, as well as the importance of the activity that gives rise to the harm.82
Perhaps most damaging to environmental claims, courts allow defendants to
73. See Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc, [1994] 1 All E.R. 53, 63 (H.L.).
Although Cambridge Water was analyzed in terms of the traditional categories of negligence, nuisance,
and the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, the Law Lords explicitly questioned the wisdom of the distinctions
among the three groupings. See id. at 76 (asserting that "a more coherent body of common law principles
[would result if Rylands v. Fletcher] were to be regarded essentially as an extension of the law of
nuisance"); id. at 71-72 (implying that law on damages for nuisance has been evolving towards that on
negligence for past sixty years); see also 34 LORD HAILsHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, HALSBURY'S LAWS
OF ENGLAND 29 n.1 (4th ed. 1980) [hereinafter 34 HALSBURY'S LAWS].
74. 34 HALSBURY's LAWS, supra note 73, I (footnote omitted).
75. HUGHES, supra note 45, at 44.
76. Id. at 44-45.
77. See, e.g., Bolton v. Stone, [19511 1 All E.R. 1078 (H.L.) (stating in dicta that "the occupier
of a cricket ground owes a duty of care to persons on an adjacent highway or on neighbouring property
who may be in the way of balls driven out of the ground") (Lord Normand, concurring); see also
HUGHES, supra note 45, at 27 (noting that action for injury to passer-by on highway due to defective
abutting premises should lie in negligence).
78. Goldman v. Hargrave, [1966] 2 All E.R. 989, 995 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Austi.).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Stephens v. Anglian Water Authority, [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1381 (C.A.) (holding that
landowners have right to extract water on their own property, with no duty of care to neighbors, even
where subsidence resulting from extraction damages neighbor's property).
81. HUGHES, supra note 45, at 44 (emphasis added).
82. 34 HALSOURY'S LAWS, supra note 73, 11.
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avoid liability if they complied with what were at the time standard
practices,83 particularly if those practices satisfied relevant contemporary
regulations.84 Thus negligence law not only frequently fails to supply
financial resources for remediation, it also usually provides no incentive to
waste site owners to improve their operating standards. Given the relatively
recent application of environmental controls to waste management sites, many
potentially dangerous sites are exempt from negligence liability because they
operated in accordance with the lax standards of the day. 5
Further, even after finding liability, courts often do not award adequate
damages to finance substantial remediation. The current rule on damages,
stated in Dominion Mosaics and Tile v. Trafalgar Trucking,86 distinguishes
between commercial and residential property. In cases involving property that
did not "consist of business or income-earning premises," only the diminution
in the market value of the property resulting from the tort is awarded. This
sum is often less than the cost of restoring the property to its original
condition.87 Thus, since most affected properties are non-commercial, a
"license to pollute" is available at a cost that is at most equal to the original
value of the damaged property. The license is even cheaper where
homeowners are unable, financially or otherwise, to bring suit to collect the
"license fee." As a result, with regard to residential properties, this rule on
damages serves the purposes of deterrence and remediation poorly.
In contrast, "[w]here business premises are concerned, the need to carry
on the business and to mitigate the loss of earnings is an important factor."88
As a result, damages are determined by a "reinstatement" standard, under
which the owner of the damaged property is compensated for his lost
profits.89 Even under the reinstatement standard, however, the courts'
emphasis on financial factors again indicates that violators will in most cases
have the option of purchasing a relatively inexpensive license to pollute. For
instance, where less expensive methods of redress are available (e.g., in the
case of groundwater contamination, replacing well water with a public or
bottled source), the courts are likely to order such a remedy, and then only
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Budden v. BP Oil Ltd., 124 Sol. J. 376 (1992) (C.A.) (holding that, for injuries
attributed to air pollution, defendants "could not be held to be negligent and failing in their duty ... in
complying with the requirements prescribed by the secretary of state and approved by Parliament").
Defenses relying on standard practices or regulatory compliance (or both) are based on the foreseeability
requirement of negligence. A person operating under standard practices and/or within regulatory limits is
presumed to have little chance of "foreseeing" harm resulting from those activities.
85. To this day, landfills are developed without an explicit design life that would give some
indication of "how long they are expected to remain safe and/or when they will cease to be a hazard."
HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, app. at 571 (submission of Clayton Bostock Hill & Rigby Ltd.). Thus,
even current design standards do not establish a standard of care regarding the life span of landfills.
86. [1990] 2 All E.R. 247 (C.A.) (finding liability where defendant's negligent demolition activities
caused fire that destroyed plaintiffs place of business).
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for the party bringing suit, even when other parties may be affected. In one
case in which a "cheap fix" was not available, the court went so far as to
state in dicta that, were the defendant liable for remediating the contaminated
groundwater on the plaintiff's property, the defendant "would have no right
that I am aware of to enter [other adjacent properties not owned by the
plaintiff] and purify . . . the aquifer there."9" In other words, comprehensive
remediation was beyond reach of the court; had liability been found,
"reinstatement" would have been limited to the particular plaintiff.91 Courts
often ignore not only the interests of possible unrepresented parties, but also
potential future site uses and the intrinsic value of a safe environment, which
might otherwise call for remediation.
In general, the courts' limitation of remedies in these actions to monetary
recovery, combined with procedural restrictions on class actions in Great
Britain, results in repetitive litigation specific to each parcel of property, even
where the sources of pollution are discrete and identifiable. 92 Not only does
this approach increase transaction costs by requiring extensive litigation, but
it also ignores the economies of scale that may be realized through integrated
remediation projects. In addition to thwarting environmental remediation
goals, the reinstatement standard, as currently applied, provides little
deterrence to polluters, who are aware that time is on their side in extended
litigation93 that most often results in the remedy cheapest to them.
In sum, the negligence rule serves both remediation and deterrence goals
poorly. Besides the one-plaintiff, one-defendant bias of the common law,
90. Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc (Q.B.), reported in Case Law Analysis:
Strict Liability for Environmental Law: The Deficiencies of the Common Law, 4 J. ENVTL. L. 81, 101
(1992) [hereinafter Cambridge Water Case Law Analysisl, upheld, [19941 1 All E.R. 53 (H.L.). The
plaintiff was in the business of supplying water to approximately 275,000 people in the Cambridge area.
The aquifer at issue, prior to discovery of the contamination, provided on average 1.27 million gallons
of water per day, or approximately one-eighth of the plaintiff's total supply. Cambridge Water Case Law
Analysis, supra, at 81-82.
91. Cambridge Water Case Law Analysis, supra note 90, at 104-05. For the purposes of review on
appeal, the court outlined two possible remedies it would consider if liability were imposed. These
included an air stripper specific to the plaintiff's operations (i.e., not for general remedial purposes), which
was rejected for technical reasons, and reimbursement for the cost of locating and building another
extraction facility upstream from the contamination. Id.
92. Under the Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, 0.15, r.12, reprinted as amended in 1 THE
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 1988, at 208 (Sir Jack I.H. Jacob et al. eds., 8th ed. 1988), British courts
recognize a right of "representative action" that is much more limited in scope than its U.S. counterpart.
In particular, representative actions are "not available to a number of different individuals where the relief
sought is damages." Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union v. Times Newspapers,
[1980] Q.B. 585, 601. Although this limitation arguably still allows suits for injunctive relief requiring
site remediation, no such suits could be identified. Cf. Medcalf v. R. Strawbridge, Ltd., [1937] 2 K.B.
102 (enjoining destructive use of road in representative action brought by frontagers of road); see also
Environment Minister Criticizes EC Paper on Civil Liability for Environmental Damage, 16 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 774, 774 (Oct. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Environment Minister Criticizes EC Paper] (citing
government finding that "industry and insurers are particularly concerned that the power to prosecute
claims for damage to the broader environment should not be extended to [interest groups] as guardians of
the environment").
93. For example, the Cambridge Water litigation lasted ten years from the cessation of operations
due to pollution to the case's final disposition on appeal. Cambridge Water Co., [1994] 1 All E.R. at 66
(H.L).
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difficulties arise in establishing causation, duty of care, and damages.
B. Nuisance
The doctrine of nuisance is more closely tied to real property interests
than the negligence rule, and it is more likely to involve injuries arising from
continuing conditions rather than single events. 94 While these features
suggest that nuisance claims may address waste site contamination more
effectively than negligence claims, other aspects of nuisance law have
prevented such a result. Establishing liability for nuisance requires, first, an
unlawful act, defined as "the interference by act or omission with a person's
use or enjoyment of land or some right over or in connection with land,""5
and, second, actual or presumed damage.96
Common law nuisances are divided into public nuisances, which "affect0
the reasonable comfort and convenience of a class of Her Majesty's
subjects," 97 and private nuisances, which affect only particular individuals.
Put another way, a public nuisance "is so widespread in its range . . . that it
would not be reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings on his own
responsibility to put a stop to it, but that it should be taken on the
responsibility of the community at large."" Once a landowner becomes
aware of the existence of a public nuisance on his property, "it is his duty to
abate it, or to endeavour to abate it, even though he is entirely innocent of
either causing the nuisance or of allowing it to continue. " " At common law,
a private party may bring a public nuisance claim only if he can show that he
"has suffered some particular, foreseeable and substantial damage over and
above that sustained by the public at large."" °° This restriction, along with
the concept of social harm inherent in public nuisance, has prompted the
codification of most pollution-related public nuisance claims as statutory
nuisances, which are discussed further below. The codification of public
nuisances is particularly prevalent in the regulated waste industry."0 '
Private nuisance claims, on the other hand, are complicated by the
defenses of prescriptive right and statutory authority, which are not recognized
94. But see British Celanese Ltd. v. A.H. Hunt (Capacitors) Ltd., [1969] 1 W.L.R. 959 (Q.B.)
(finding liability in nuisance from single incident of metal foil carried by wind from defendant's property
and damaging nearby electrical equipment).
95. 34 HALSBURY's LAWS, supra note 73, 309.
96. Id.
97. HUGHES, supra note 45, at 25.
98. Attorney General v. P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd., [1957] 2 Q.B. 169, 191 (Crim. App.) (Denning,
L.J., concurring).
99. Job Edwards, Ltd. v. Proprietors of Birmingham Navigations, [1924] 1 K.B. 341, 350 (Crim.
App.). In fact, courts have recognized that the person threatened with injury due to private nuisance may
have "the exceptional right to enter upon the land on which the nuisance exists and to do what is necessary
to abate it" because "in some cases ... the law [does] not afford any other remedy." Id.
100. 34 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 73, 370 (footnote omitted).
101. See generally infra part IV.B.I.c.
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against public nuisance actions. °2 A prescriptive right is created where "the
nuisance complained of has ... been actionable or preventable by the
plaintiff," who nevertheless has failed to take appropriate action for a
prescribed amount of time, currently twenty years in Great Britain. 0 3 The
prescriptive right defense, however, is inapplicable in cases "where the
pollution was unknown to and unsuspected by the plaintiff."" ° Its use is
even more limited because a polluter's prescriptive right does not start tolling
when the damaging use begins, but when environmental damage actually
occurs. 1
05
On the other hand, the defense of statutory authority disposes of many
nuisance claims arising from waste management practices, which have a long
history of government regulation. Where a nuisance claim targets conduct
authorized by a statute, this defense subjects the claim to a rule of standard
(i.e., negligence-based), rather than strict, liability.'" In other words, a
claim of private nuisance faced with a defense of statutory authority is only
as strong as the same claim based on negligence, already found to be
inadequate."0 7 Again, neither restoration nor deterrence is served by a
system that fails to hold polluters financially responsible.
C. Rylands v. Fletcher
Rylands v. Fletcher'"8 pronounced a standard of strict liability - that
is, liability imposed even without a finding of negligence on the part of the
defendant. The original rule has been repeated in perhaps more British cases
on torts associated with land than any other passage:
[ihe person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not
do so, is primafacie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its
escape. .. . mhe neighbour, who has brought something on his own property which was
not naturally there.., which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour's,
102. 34 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 73, 375.
103. Id. 376; cf. Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Co., [1961] 1 W.L.R. 683, 696 (Q.B.) (denying
defense of prescriptive right because nuisance "hald] not continued for anything approaching 20 years").
104. Scott-Whitehead v. National Coal Bd., 53 P. & C.R. 263 (Q.B. 1987).
105. Id.
106. In other words, where Parliament "has authorized ... an undertaking or works, that carries
with it an authority to do what is authorised with immunity from any action based on nuisance." Such
"undertakings" might still be subject to a claim of negligence, here defined as a lack of "reasonable regard
and care for the interests of other persons." Allen v. Gulf Oil Refining Ltd., [1981] 1 All E.R. 353, 356
(H.L.).
107. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Indeed, Cambridge Water suggests that the law of
nuisance is becoming a subcategory of the law of negligence in other respects as well. Cambridge Water
Co., [1994] 1 All E.R. at 71-72 (H.L.) (implying that law of nuisance is converging with that of
negligence with respect to, inter alia, claims for damages). In particular, the Law Lords stated in dicta
that "foreseeability [of harm] should be a prerequisite of liability in damages for nuisance as it is of
liability in negligence" because they saw no reason to favor claims of nuisance over those of negligence.
Id. at 72; cf. Allen & Overy, supra note 72, at 26 (stating traditional rule that "plaintiff [in a nuisance
claim] does not need to show that the defendant has been negligent").
108. [1866] 1 L.R. 265 (Ex.).
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should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in
confining it to his own property."°
The predictable repetition of this text in British cases concerning pollution is
presumably due to a concern for tradition; almost never is the rule applied as
stated.
The phrase "something . . .which was not naturally there" in the original
case has given rise to a "natural use" exception that nearly swallows the rule.
Read v. J. Lyons & Co. ,"o although decided on other grounds, is often cited
as authority for the proposition that the manufacture of explosives may be
considered a natural use of land."' More recently, the trial court in
Cambridge Water held that storing large quantities of organic solvents on a
facility set in a residential neighborhood was a natural land use."'
Apparently recognizing the absurd lengths to which the phrase "natural use"
was being stretched, Lord Goff in the final appeal of Cambridge Water felt
"bound to say that the storage of substantial quantities of chemicals on
industrial premises should be regarded as an almost classic case of non-natural
use.""1 Since the case was decided in the defendant's favor because of lack
of foreseeability, however, he found it unnecessary at that point "to attempt
any redefinition of the concept of natural or ordinary use."" 4
In sum, despite its continuing importance in supplying remedies where
Parliament has not yet provided any alternatives, British common law does
little to reallocate losses from land contamination, and it has shown little
tendency to evolve in the face of emerging environmental harms." 5
However, Parliament has begun to realize that problems exist, although the
actions it has taken in response are of arguable efficacy.,
109. Id. at 279-80 (Blackburn, J.).
110. [1946] 2 All E.R. 471 (H.L.) (holding that where there is escape from control rather than
escape from premises, Rylands v. Fletcher does not apply).
111. See, e.g., 34 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 73, 340 n.2.
112. Cambridge Water Case Law Analysis, supra note 90, at 97 (relying on judge's observation of
"the innumerable small works that one sees up and down the country with drums stored in their yards").
113. [1994] 1 All E.R. at79 (H.L.).
114. Id.
115. Even this assertion is difficult to understate. As late as 1990 the Department of the Environment
found "no reported cases in the UK concerning the application of relevant common law principles to
contaminated land issues." DoE, CONTAMINATED LAND, supra note 13, at 12. One case strikingly similar
to Cambridge Water was decided on appeal in favor of the plaintiff. Ballard v. Tomlinson, (1885) 29 Ch.
D. 115 (C.A.) (awarding damages in nuisance for plaintiff-brewer whose well was fouled by defendant-
neighbor's disposal of printing and sanitary wastes through abandoned well). However, the only modem
application of Ballard to hold for the plaintiff in a pollution case was the Court of Appeals decision in
Cambridge Water, which awarded the plaintiff over £1 million plus interest. [1994] 1 All E.R. at 62
(C.A.). When the decision was overturned in the House of Lords, Lord Goff somewhat cryptically
dismissed the Court of Appeals' reliance on Ballard because "the point [on foreseeability] did not arise"
in that case. [1994] 1 All E.R. at 68 (H.L.).
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IV. STATUTORY REFORM
A. Historic Background
Britain has a long legislative tradition of regulating waste accumulations.
The Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Act 1848 (Nuisance Act)
first gave local authorities the capacity to inspect upon complaint any premises
that might be "in such a filthy and unwholesome Condition as to be a
Nuisance to or injurious to the Health of any Person," including any "Ditch,
Gutter, Drain, Privy, Cesspool, or Ashpit. .. or any Accumulation of Dung,
Manure, Offal, Filth, [or] Refuse. " " 6 The Nuisance Act also allowed local
authorities to bring the owner or occupier of premises before a justice, who
could order "Removal or Abatement of any such Cause or Causes of
Complaint.""' If the order of the justice was not obeyed, the authorities
could enter the premises to perform abatement and later recover their costs in
a civil action,"' including an action predicated upon joint and several
liability." 9 Where the authorities could not recover damages from the owner
or occupier of the premises, abatement costs were to be recovered from the
local "Funds [for the] Relief of the Poor.""2 These provisions were
reinforced in the Sanitary Act 1866,"2 which transformed the capacity of
the "Nuisance Authority" to inspect upon complaint into a duty to inspect
periodically. "
This general regime was reauthorized, with a few notable modifications,
in the Public Health Act 1936. l" The Public Health Act increased local
authorities' participation in waste management by allowing them to "undertake
the removal of trade refuse" at the request of the owner or occupier of the
premises,' 24 but restricted authorities from undertaking "a general collection
of trade refuse. " " In addition, the Public Health Act allowed private
citizens directly to bring an action for abatement of a statutory nuisance. 126
It is not clear whether local authorities utilized these provisions efficiently
to redress pollution. Certainly, the authorities made little effort to police
inactive waste sites. 7 At any rate, this issue was largely rendered moot by
116. Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., ch. 123, § 1.
117. Id.
118. Id. § 3.
119. Id. § 18.
120. Id. § 4.
121. Sanitary Act, 1866, 29 & 30 Vict., ch. 90.
122. Id. § 20.
123. Public Health Act, 1936, 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8, ch. 49, §§ 92-97.
124. Id. §§ 73-74.
125. Id. § 74.
126. Id. § 99.
127. Historically, the United Kingdom has viewed inactive contaminated sites as a constraint on
development only, and thus "major public healthienvironmental problems may remain unremedied for
many years." HC, TOXIC WAsTE, supra note 2, app. at 561 (submission of Clayton Bostock Hill & Rigby
Ltd.). Typically, cleanup is considered only where land values are sufficiently high to provide an
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COPA 1974.121 With respect to waste, COPA 1974 sought primarily to
regulate the operation of disposal sites, rather than provide for site
remediation; while it outlined requirements for site inspection and entry by
authorities in great detail," 9 it contained no provision for the abatement of
contamination or the recovery of abatement costs.130 The cost recovery
sections of the Public Health Act were not repealed, but, significantly, they
were not reauthorized either. Furthermore, in the only area where COPA
1974 did provide for civil liability for damage "caused by poisonous, noxious
or polluting waste" - where that waste was deposited illegally' - it made
recovery more difficult by requiring proof under a higher criminal, rather than
civil, standard.'
COPA 1974 was widely criticized'33 for repealing the Public Health Act
1936 prohibition of local authorities' participation in the "general collection
of trade refuse. " 134 Indeed, the opening sections of COPA 1974, which
detail licensing and planning requirements for the disposal of waste to land,
clearly recognize a dual role for regulators as operators.135  Placing
regulators in direct competition with the regulated has had far-reaching
implications for subsequent regulation of waste management. 36 COPA 1974
has been widely decried as allowing foxes to guard the chicken coop137
because of the prevalence of double standards in the regulation of publicly and
privately held waste sites.
Moreover, government officials in Britain consult industry representatives
extensively before making or enforcing environmental regulatory policies. 38
This practice has led to an institutional resistance to public participation in the
industry-government relationship. Indeed, "British pollution-control policy is
basically made and enforced in private, by a 'family-like, ...close-knit
group of experts proud of their traditions and the trust placed in them by the
incentive. Id. app. at 572.
128. Control of Pollution Act, 1974, ch. 40.
129. Id. §§ 91-93.
130. "A major deficiency of COPA is that it only relates to waste disposal sites when they are active
and a licence holder may at any time surrender his licence. Landfills... pose a long term threat to the
water environment, long after the deposition of waste has finished." HC, ToxIc WASTE, supra note 2,
app. at 67 (submission of Water Authorities Association).
131. COPA 1974 § 88.
132. Id. (applying criminal provisions of §§ 18(2), 3(3)). The criminal standard of proof clearly
favors the defendant. In a criminal action, if the burden of proof lies with the prosecution, the required
standard is "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Where the defense bears the burden, the standard is
reduced to "the civil standard of the balance of probabilities." 11(2) LORD HAILSHAM OF ST.
MARYLEBONE, HALSBRY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1066 (4th ed. reissue 1990).
133. See, e.g., HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, at xl-xli; HC, DRAFr DntECTIVE, supra note 13,
at xix.
134. COPA 1974 § 108(2), sched. 4.
135. See id. § 11(2) ("If any land occupied by a disposal authority is used by the authority as a site
on which to deposit or permit other persons to deposit controlled waste . . . ."); see also id. §§ 1-10.
136. See HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, at xl-xli.
137. Or, in British, as providing inadequate "separation of the poacher and gamekeeper roles." HC,
DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 13, at xix.
138. VOGEL, supra note 52, at 257.
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public.'"'
While many of these "traditions" of excluding the public originated at the
enforcement level, Parliament has proven eager to follow suit, effectively
barring public participation in the regulatory process by attaching disclosure
prohibitions to numerous statutes. For example, the Rivers (Prevention of
Pollution) Act 1951 required local river boards to maintain a register of all
conditions imposed on sewage discharges into streams that "shall be open to
inspection... by any person appearing to the river board to be interested in
the outlet."' 40 However, virtually every river board interpreted "interested"
to mean only "those with a property interest at the point of discharge," i.e.,
the polluters themselves.' A decade later, the Rivers (Prevention of
Pollution) Act 1961 codified this interpretation and made it a criminal offense
punishable by fine and/or imprisonment to disclose information gathered under
the act without the consent of the regulated party. 142 In fact, the penalty on
summary conviction was greater for unlawful disclosure than for pollution
offenses under the primary provisions of the act. 143 While most of both acts
has been repealed over the years, the disclosure prohibitions of the 1961 Act
were still in force in March 1994.'"
These provisions reflect a clear government-industry consensus that public
involvement in environmental regulation should be minimized. A prominent
government official once stated: "I am a great believer in informing the
public, but not in giving them figures they can't interpret. You would get
amateur environmental experts and university scientists playing around with
them. People can become scared of figures, they can get the wind up." 145
This fear of public participation extends beyond the substance of regulation
to the process of regulatory policy development.' 46 In the absence of a
139. Id. at 91-92 (quoting Timothy O'Riordan, Role of Environmental Quality Objectives: Te
Politics of Pollution Control, in I PROGRESS IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PLANNING 239, 241 (Timothy O'Riordan & Ralph C. D'Arge eds., 1979)).
140. Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 64, § 7(7).
141. VOGEL, supra note 52, at 93.
142. Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 50, § 12.
143. Summary conviction for illegal disclosure of information carried a maximum penalty of £100
and three months imprisonment. Id. § 12(2). In contrast, summary conviction for pollution offenses carried
only a £100 fine. Id. §§ 1(7)(b), 7(1).
144. The fine imposed for illegal disclosure of information was set by "the standard scale" of fines
defined in the Criminal Justice Act, 1982, ch. 48 § 37(2), and updated by the Criminal Justice Act, 1991,
ch. 53 § 17(2). See HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES: CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT (4)49/3
(Rona Johnstone ed., 4th ed. 1993) (noting application of these provisions to the 1961 Act). Thus, § 12
of the 1961 Act was in force at the date of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. In addition, a LEXIS search
of British legislation revealed no revision or repeal provisions regarding § 12 since 1991.
145. VOGEL, supra note 52, at 92 (citing 1972 comment of chief alkali inspector, in Jon Tinker,
Britain's Environment - Nanny Knows Best, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 9, 1977, at 553); see also Minister
Hits Out, supra note 70 (reporting UK Environment Minister's pronouncement that the government "would
be 'very cautious' about giving enhanced status to non-governmental organisations in respect of civil
actions for environmental damage").
146. For example, the HC Committee declared that "it seems sensible to us for the waste industry,
the insurance industry, and the Government to press ahead with a joint working group to explore the
possibility of evolving a total package ... for the protection of the environment and cleanup of the
consequences of unforeseen damage." HC, DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 13, at xxxviii.
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consciousness-raising disaster,'47 such barriers to public participation have
proven intractable. Even pressure from the European Union to increase the
public availability of government-held environmental information1 48 has been
less than effective. 149 At any rate, it remains to be seen how environmental
groups will enter the debate on the regulation of waste management and how
effective they will be once there. 50
In summary, the past 130 years in Britain have witnessed an increasing
involvement of local waste regulation authorities in the waste management
industry, along with a gradual de-emphasis of civil remedies in general and
the recovery of abatement costs for public nuisances in particular. The dual
role of many authorities as regulators as well as competitors frustrates
deterrence efforts, and the lack of adequate statutory tools stymies remediation
goals. Further, Parliament has codified a cultural bias for regulation through
close government-industry relationships to the exclusion of the public. All the
while, the British public mostly expresses an incongruous level of confidence
in the protection afforded by the system.'' It is in this setting that a flourish
of environmental legislation occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
B. Recent Initiatives
In the last five years, Parliament has enacted measures with broad
implications for environmental regulation. The Environmental Protection Act
1990, the Water Act 1989, and the Water Resources Act 1991 affect a range
of issues regarding waste management and landfill remediation.
147. See, e.g., DoE, Toxic WASTE, supra note 10, at 4-5 (claiming that lack of disasters in United
Kingdom has allowed "a rational approach towards waste disposal [to] be maintained").
148. See Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment, Council Directive 901313, 1990
O.J. (L 158) 56.
149. See, e.g., HUGHES, supra note 45, at 21 ("UK law will continue to lack a codified right of
access to environmental information and.., implementation of the Directive will take place in an ad hoc,
topic by topic manner."). Although the House of Commons feels that "changing legislation will mean that
more information from the monitoring of polluting activities is made publicly available," HC, Toxic
WASTE, supra note 2, at lxix, some environmentalists insist that "the government plans to renege on
promises made by Prime Minister John Major and 'flout (European Community) law on the public's right
to know about the environment.'" Government Denies Charge of Evading Cotmnitments on Access to
Environment Data, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 749 (Nov. 18, 1992); see also EC Directive Not Being
Implemented, FoE Says, supra note 3, at 238.
150. This is not to say that British environmental groups are generally inactive. See William Wilson,
Environmental Law as Development Assistance, 22 ENVTL. L. 960-61 n.34 (1992) (noting that aggregate
membership of three environmental groups is over twice that of all major political parties); VOGEL, supra
note 52, at 20 (citing parallel increase in membership and activity of environmental organizations in Britain
and the United States since mid-1960s). However, until recently, the environmental lobby has been notably
silent with regard to landfills, "in marked contrast to their reaction to the disposal of nuclear wastes or
the dumping of wastes into the North Sea." HC, TOXIC WASTE, supra note 2, at lxix; cf. supra note 3
(noting recent activities of FoE).
151. "Indeed, the very idea of voluntary bodies organizing themselves with official encouragement
to 'hunt the dump' as happens elsewhere rings strangely in British ears since local authority environmental
health officers ... have been doing this as part of their normal duties for over a century." NIGEL HAIGH,
EEC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND BRITAIN 127 (2d ed. 1989).
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1. Environmental Protection Act 1990
The Environmental Protection Act (EPA) 1990"52 seeks, inter alia, to
re-enact the provisions of the Control of Pollution Act 1974 relating to waste on land with
modifications as respects the functions of the regulatory and other authorities concerned in
the collection and disposal of waste, ... [and] restate the law defining statutory nuisances
and improve the summary procedures for dealing with them."'
The scope of EPA 1990 is wide. In addition to waste on land, the act
regulates, among other things, air pollution and genetically modified
organisms. With respect to waste management, it modifies the regulatory and
operating roles of local authorities and broadens the scope of criminal liability
for environmental harm caused by waste. In addition, EPA 1990 restructures
the nuisance control provisions for all statutory nuisances, including those
defined by the Public Health Act 1936.
a. Involvement of Local Authorities in Regulated Operations
Section 32 of EPA 1990 directs local waste disposal authorities to form
waste disposal companies and transfer to those companies "the relevant part
of their undertakings," unless the local authority has already made
arrangements to guarantee adequate separation of regulatory and operating
functions."i 4 These companies may not engage in activities other than "the
disposal, keeping, or treatment of waste and the collection of waste."'
Although the local authority is permitted to maintain ownership and control
of a waste disposal company, it must exercise control in such a way that "the
company is an arm's length company."156 This ambiguous provision - EPA
1990's primary safeguard against the conflicts of interest inherent in the dual
role of owner/regulator - casts a shadow on the authorities' ability to provide
deterrence at sites they own. Furthermore, nothing in the act prohibits sole
ownership of an "arm's length company" by a locality. Thus, regardless of
any improvement in the separation of regulatory and operation functions,
financial responsibility for waste sites in some cases remains with local
governments, a result with serious implications for remediation financing.' 7
152. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, ch. 43.
153. Id. pmbl.
154. Id. § 32(2)-(4).
155. Id. § 32(8).
156. Id. § 32(9).
157. The formation of independent companies could lead to the absence of a party financially
responsible for contaminated sites. Depending on the legal structure of a waste disposal company, financial
problems resulting from remediation operations (or even merely from competition) could result in
bankruptcy, which would presumably insulate the parent municipality. See DoE, Toxic WASTE, supra
note 10, at9 ("[L]ocal authorities' disposal operations, when organised into [companies], should be opened
up to competition with the private sector rather than being able to rely on guaranteed markets in
perpetuity.").
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b. Liability Rules
Section 33 of EPA 1990 codifies, for the first time, a prohibition on
waste management practices based solely on the likelihood of harm to the
environment, without reference to the violation of a rule, license provision,
or regulatory action such as an abatement order.'58 Although this provision
is a step toward strict liability for environmental pollution, it is unlikely
actually to facilitate site remediation, because it creates criminal rather than
civil liability." 9 Fines imposed under EPA 1990 are large relative to
traditional pollution penalties,16 but the act's intent is clearly deterrence
rather than remediation; there is no mention of remediation or damages in this
context. Finally, beyond the problems of proving liability under a criminal
standard, Section 33 complicates prosecution by allowing the defense that a
person "took all reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid
the commission of the offence." 6' These modified liability rules of EPA
1990 do not advance the goals of remediation, and they provide deterrence
only to the limited extent that authorities are willing to impose criminal
sanctions on polluters.
c. Statutory Nuisances
A statutory nuisance "is one which, whether or not it constitutes a
nuisance at common law, is made a nuisance by statute either in express terms
or by implication."' 62 EPA 1990 provides a streamlined and comprehensive
source of authority for remedying statutory nuisances, including those caused
by air pollutants, odors, animals, deposits to land, or any other nuisance
defined by statute, such as the Public Health Act 1936,63 which is a source
of much of the language in EPA 1990.
Some have suggested that placing all statutory nuisance provisions in an
environmental protection rather than public health statute "may have the effect
of ensuring that the term 'nuisance' is no longer given a restrictive
meaning. " t1 4 However, consolidating statutory nuisance law under a green
umbrella does not guarantee greater environmental remediation. In addition
to their reluctance to apply common law principles to fund cleanups, courts
158. "[A] person shall not... (c) treat, keep or dispose of controlled waste in a manner likely to
cause pollution of the environment or harm to human health." EPA 1990 § 33(1)(c).
159. Id. § 33(8)-(9).
160. A magistrates court, on conviction, can levy a fine as high as £20,000 (about US$35,000),
while there is no limit on the fine a crown court may set. Industry "Ill-Prepared,' supra note 71, at 240.
The maximum prison sentence under this section is five years. EPA 1990 § 33(9)(b).
161. EPA 1990 § 33(7)(a).
162. 34 HAMsBURY's LAWs, supra note 73, 304.
163. EPA 1990 § 79.
164. DoE, CONTAMINATED LAND, supra note 13, at 21.
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have shown resistance to honoring the spirit of environmental statutes.165
Perhaps the greatest innovation of EPA 1990 with respect to nuisances is its
provision for summary proceedings whereby a local authority has the capacity
to issue an abatement order without court approval.'66
Further sections of EPA 1990 restate the compensation for abatement
provisions of the Public Health Act 1936,167 which were de-emphasized by
COPA 1974,168 and render creators of statutory nuisances liable "whether
or not what any one of them is responsible for would by itself amount to a
nuisance."169 This provision could prove helpful in the remediation of waste
sites when a party argues that its responsibility for the contamination "by
itself" was insignificant. In this context, however, the term "persons
responsible" is virtually always limited to those connected with the land
(owners, occupiers, and, occasionally, trespassers' 70), as opposed to waste
generators who have contracted with an owner or occupier for disposal. Thus,
the utility of this provision is confined to facilitating remediation efforts that
are complicated by the presence of more than one site owner or operator.
As in the Public Health Act 1936, actions for statutory nuisances may be
brought by private partieslll as well as local authorities. The procedures and
standards for private and government actions are for the most part
parallel. Only the government has the authority to remediate and recover
its costs at a site that has defaulted under a cleanup order.' 73 However,
where a private party initiated the action, it can recover the expenses of
remediation only after a court has found the defaulting party criminally
liable. 74 On the other hand, a local authority has discretion to proceed
against a defaulting party under either the civil or the criminal provisions of
EPA 1990 or both. 7" This dichotomy decreases the efficacy of private suits
in funding site remediation.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to recovery for remediation in private party
suits is the "best practicable means" defense whereby the use of "best
practicable means . . . to prevent, or to counteract the effects of, the
165. In a case of illegal dumping, despite a clear statutory violation, the "fly-tipper" was fined less
than what the generator had paid him to commit the crime in the first place. The HC Committee remarked
that "the Courts were treating these matters so lightly that the... Authorities felt that it was not worth
their time and expense to mount prosecutions." HC, Toxic WASTE, supra note 2, at lvii.
166. EPA 1990 § 80.
167. Compare id. § 81(3)-(4) with Public Health Act, 1936, § 96.
168. See supra notes 128, 131-132 and accompanying text.
169. EPA 1990 § 81(1).
170. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Act, 1990, 35 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND
WALES § 79, n. Sub-s (7) (Andrew Davies & Lorena Sutherland eds., 4th ed. 1993).
171. EPA 1990 § 82.
172. This parallelism suggests that, at least with respect to statutory nuisances, there is now less of
a distinction between private nuisances and public nuisances. See supra text accompanying notes 97-107.
173. EPA 1990 §§ 81(3)-(4), 82(11).
174. Id. § 82(11); see supra note 132 (noting higher standard of proof in criminal actions relative
to civil actions).
175. EPA 1990 § 81(3)-(4).
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[statutory] nuisance" provides a defense against criminal proceedings for
failure to abate under an order.'76 Although this defense is allowed in suits
brought by either local authorities"7 or private parties,' 78 it is a greater
barrier in private party remediation suits since private parties must first
overcome the "best practicable means" defense in a criminal proceeding
before making a civil claim for damages. In contrast, local authorities are not
required to meet the more demanding criminal standards to recover in a civil
action. They could of course intervene with a separate suit when private
parties face this roadblock, but nothing in EPA 1990 encourages such actions.
Furthermore, the DoE has taken the position that where waste deposits have
contaminated adjoining properties, each owner must bear the cleanup cost of
its own property. 79 When the British bias against public participation in
industry regulation is also considered, 8 ' the inadequacy of private party
actions under EPA 1990 for remediation becomes apparent.
Although EPA 1990 contains many positive reforms regarding the
regulation of active sites, its primary aim is deterrence rather than
remediation. This is most evident in its prohibition of municipalities'
continued operational control of - but not financial responsibility for -
disposal sites. The modified liability rules may be precursors to broadening
remedies for pollution abatement, but since the new rules apply only in
criminal cases, they still do not expand the availability of funding for
remediation. Nuisance proceedings have been streamlined somewhat,
particularly where the action is brought by the government, but with respect
to the recovery of abatement costs, EPA 1990 provides only limited
improvement over legal mechanisms that have been available to local
authorities since the mid-1800s."' In sum, despite the broad changes in
waste disposal regulation enacted by EPA 1990, the law has not advanced in
its ability to allocate financial responsibility for environmental harms caused
by waste.
2. Water Act 1989
In addition to the provisions of EPA 1990 aimed at a wide range of waste
management activities, Parliament recently passed legislation addressing the
potential impact of waste disposal practices on water resources. The Water
176. Id. § 80(7). "Best practicable means" is defined in terms of "local conditions and
circumstances, ... the current state of technical knowledge and . . .financial implications." In addition,
"the test is to apply only so far as compatible with any duty imposed by law." Id. § 79(9).
177. Id. § 80(1), (7)-(8).
178. Id. § 82(1), (9)-(10).
179. Paul Luiki & Dale Stephenson, European Community Waste Policy: At the Brink of a New Era,
14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 403, 408 n.27 (July 17, 1991).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 138-150.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 116-120.
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Act 1989182 established the National Rivers Authority (NRA), which
assumed the responsibilities of ten regional authorities for, inter alia, water
pollution and water resource management.' However, most substantive
provisions of this act were repealed by the Water Resources Act 1991,184
which further defined the role and powers of the NRA.
3. Water Resources Act 1991
Dissatisfied with the patchwork of statutes governing water resources and
supply, Parliament consolidated relevant legislation in 1991.85 Under this
consolidation, the Water Resources Act 1991 was to address water quality
issues and provide a single source of authority for the NRA. Virtually all
sources of drinking water including groundwater fall under the NRA's
jurisdiction. 8 6 The act defines "Pollution Offences"' 87 and the NRA's
powers to prevent and control pollution.188
In particular, Section 85 of the act makes it an offense for a person to
"causeol or knowingly permitl any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter or
any solid waste matter to enter any controlled waters," and imposes stiff fines
and the possibility of imprisonment.' 89 However, these provisions are
distinctly criminal in nature; the act explicitly states that they shall not be
construed to "confernl a right of action in any civil proceeding. "s" The
provisions therefore support deterrence rather than remediation objectives.
The act does provide broad abatement and compensation authority to the
NRA regarding any pollution "likely to enter, or to be or to have been present
in, any controlled waters. ""' The NRA's statutory mandate is thus broad
enough to allow it to act against any waste disposal site that is polluting, or
likely to pollute, groundwater. However, the efficacy of these provisions is
significantly limited by insufficient NRA resources,9 2 for the Act provides
for recovery only after the NRA has incurred remediation expenses. 93 In
effect, Parliament provided the mechanics for combatting water pollution but
182. Water Act, 1989, ch. 15.
183. Id. § 4(1)(a)-(b), sched. 2.
184. Water Resources Act, 1991, ch. 57.
185. The Water Resources Act, 1991, the Water Industry Act, 1991, ch. 56, and the Statutory Water
Companies Act, 1991, ch. 58, form a trilogy of acts referred to as the "1991 consolidation." 49
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 4 (James Bowman ed., 4th ed. reissue 1992)
[hereinafter 49 HALSBURY's STATUTES].
186. Water Resources Act, 1991, § 104.
187. Id. §§ 85-90.
188. Id. §§ 92-97.
189. Id. § 85(1), (6).
190. Id. § 100(a).
191. Id. § 161(1).
192. Wheeler, supra note 13, at 580 ("[The NRA's] powers to carry out remedial works and recover
the costs from the polluter are proving ineffective given the lack of financial means to carry out the initial
cleanup operations.").
193. Water Resources Act, 1991, § 161(3).
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failed to prime the pump, thus frustrating both deterrence and remediation
goals.
Overall, the legislative reforms of the last several years have not
adequately addressed the problems of remediation and have provided no
realistic avenues for financing cleanup projects. Parliament's efforts to
enhance deterrence have focused on criminal provisions that allow for
significant penalties, including imprisonment in some cases. The efficacy of
these provisions, however, will depend on agency enforcement, which remains
questionable, particularly in light of the British tradition of government-
industry cooperation.
V. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES
The following explores two legal systems with different implications for
the development of British law. Section A outlines recent proposals by the
European Union to modify civil liability rules for environmental harm. EU
initiatives will have a direct, substantive impact on British law. Section B
discusses legal mechanisms developed in the United States to provide funding
for waste site remediation, with an emphasis on the lessons that this
experience provides for a British regime.
A. European Union Trends
Amidst a wide range of activity concerning waste management during the
1980s,94 the European Union has often struggled with the issue of civil
liability for environmental harm caused by waste.' In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the EU Commission issued two proposals that directly implicate
British law. The first, the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on
Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste (Waste Liability Proposal),' 96
focuses on modified civil liability rules. The second, the Council Directive on
the Landfill of Waste (Landfill Proposal), 97 suggests a broader range of
194. See, e.g., Council Directive 82/883, 1982 O.J. (L 378) 1 (waste from titanium dioxide
industry); Council Directive 89/428, 1989 O.J. (L 201) 56 (same); Council Directive 84/631, 1984 O.J.
(L 326) 31 (transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste); Council Directive 90/170, 1990 O.J. (L 92) 52
(same); Council Directive 86/278, 1986 O.J. (L 181) 6 (protection against use of sewage sludge in
agriculture); Council Directive 87/101, 1987 O.J. (L 42) 43 (waste oils); Council Directive 91/156, 1991
O.J. (L 78) 32 (waste).
195. The Proposed Directive on the Supervision and Control of Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous
Wastes Within the European Community, 1983 O.J. (C 53) 3, is the earliest proposal to include such
liability. The final directive, 84/631, 1984 O.J. (L 236) 31, ultimately promised only that "the Council
would consider 'the conditions for implementing civil liability.'" Thieffry & Nahmias, supra note 5, at
963.
196. 1989 O.J. (C 251) 3, as amended in 1991 O.J. (C 192) 6 [hereinafter Waste Liability Proposal].
The original proposal appeared October 4, 1989, and its amendments July 23, 1991.
197. 1991 O.J. (C 190) 1, as amended in COM(93)275 final [hereinafter Landfill Proposal]. The
original proposal was published in the Official Journal on July 22, 1991; the amendments are dated June
10, 1993.
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controls on landfills, including design requirements and permitting procedures,
yet it also addresses civil liability and proposes a Landfill Aftercare Fund. To
some extent the impact of both proposals has been modified by the EU
Commission's Green Paper on civil liability. '98 For example, further
consideration of the Waste Liability Proposal has "effectively been shelved to
make way for a consultation exercise" on the Green Paper,'99 and the
Landfill Proposal also awaits resolution of certain issues through the Green
Paper process.2" However, the Green Paper itself affirms the continued
vitality of both proposals.2"'
The Green Paper is broad in its scope; it is intended to address
environmental liability "in an overall manner and not from the angle of
specific economic activities."202 It contemplates the formulation of general
principles of liability applicable to a universe of environmentally damaging
events, including industrial accidents, emissions from industrial facilities and
motor vehicles, waste waters from cities and farms, and hazardous substances
deposited in the past.2 3 By its terms, the Green Paper anticipates specific
application of these principles after further consideration of particular sectors
or types of activity. 2"
To this end, the Green Paper lists "[s]ome of the factors that could be
considered in determining the appropriateness of strict liability for a particular
activity."205 More specifically, the Green Paper suggests that "answers to
198. Communication from the EU Commission to the Council and Parliament and the Economic and
Social Committee: Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM(93)47 final [hereinafter
Green Paper]. The Green Paper, dated May 14, 1993, is intended "to stimulate discussion on whether and
how requirements to remedy environmental damage might be introduced appropriately and effectively
within the Community to recover the costs of such restoration." Id. 1 4.0.
199. EC Dives into Environmental Liability Debate, EC ENERGY MONTHLY, Sept. 16, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, ECNews File.
200. Landfill Proposal, supra note 197, at II ("The Commission ... decided not to amend the
[Landfill Proposal] concerning insurance coverage at the moment, because it prefers to tackle this problem
within the general framework designed by the Green Paper on remedying environmental damage.").
201. See, e.g., Green Paper, supra note 198, 1 2.2.3, at 19 ("The initial proposal for a [Waste
Liability] Directive has been amended ... and is under consideration by the Council."). Repeated
references to the Landfill Proposal in the Green Paper, see, e.g., id. 11 2.2.3, at 19, 3.2.3, and the
publication of Landfill Proposal amendments after the appearance of the Green Paper clearly indicate that
the Landfill Proposal is still under consideration as well.
202. 1992 O.J. (C247) 41 (statement of EU Environment Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana).
203. Green Paper, supra note 198, 1 1.0.
204. Id. 1 2.1.2, at 7; see also id. 1 3.1.2 ("In order to respect the 'polluter pays' principle to the
greatest degree possible, should not the burden rest upon the sector or sectors most specifically
responsible?"); I 4.1.2(B) ("What criteriashould be used to decide whether certain activities are dangerous
and therefore to be covered by a strict liability regime?").
205. Id. 1 2.1.2, at 7. These factors include:
- the types of hazard posed by a particular activity;
- the probability that damage might occur from the activity, and possible extent of that
damage;
- the incentive that strict liability would provide for better risk management and
prevention of damage;
- the feasibility and cost of restoring the damage that would be likely to occur; and [sic]
- the potential financial burden of strict liability on the economic sector involved[; and]
- the need for and availability of insurance.
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the main issues" of civil liability for environmental damage, including "which
activities should be covered,"2" might be found in the recent Council of
Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Damage to the Environment (CoE
Convention).27 The CoE Convention singles out waste management, 20 8
particularly landfill operations, 2 9 as covered activities. It is not yet clear
whether the European Community will adopt the CoE Convention.10
Nevertheless, the Green Paper's references to the Convention along with the
Convention's emphasis on waste operations reinforce an interpretation of the
Green Paper as complementing, rather than superseding, the Waste Liability
and Landfill Proposals. The following discussion outlines the relevant portions
of the proposals in light of the more recent Green Paper.
1. The Civil Liability Debate
According to the Waste Liability Proposal, "[t]he producer of waste shall
be liable under civil law for the damage and impairment of the environment
caused by the waste, irrespective of fault on his part."" In addition, where
more than one party is liable for the same environmental impairment, each
"shall be liable jointly and severally. "212
206. Id. 4.1.2, at 27.
207. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment, opened for signature June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228 [hereinafter CoE Convention]. The
CoE Convention "aims at ensuring adequate compensation for damage resulting from activities dangerous
to the environment and also provides for means of prevention and reinstatement." Id. art 1. For a
discussion of the structure of the CoE Convention, see David Wilkinson, The Council of Europe
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment. A
Comparative Review, 2 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 130 (1993).
208. See CoE Convention, supra note 207, art. 2(1)(c) (defining "dangerous activity" as including
"the operation of an installation or site for the incineration, treatment, handling or recycling of waste").
209. See id. art. 7 (titled "Liability in respect of sites for the permanent deposit of waste"); art.
2(1)(d) (defining "dangerous activity" as including "the operation of a site for the permanent deposit of
waste").
210. Upon its opening for signature, the CoE Convention was signed by four EU members (Greece,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) as well as by Cyprus, Finland, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. 32
I.L.M. 1228, 1228. France, also an EU member, as well as Switzerland are considered likely to sign,
while the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Irish Republic (all EU members) along with the Czech
Republic are expected to abstain. Seven [sic] Countries Are First Signatories to Environmental Civil
Liability Convention, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 471, 471 (June 30, 1993) (neglecting to mention Iceland).
In addition, the Green Paper granted the EU Commission a negotiating mandate with regard to the CoE
Convention, see Green Paper, supra note 198, Annex IV, at 7, while the prospect of EU adoption is left
open by the Green Paper, id. 4.1.2, at 27, and has been termed "a real possibility" by at least one
commentator, see David Wilkinson, EC Green Paper on Remedying Damage to the Environment:
COM(93)47, 2 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 159, 160 (1993). On the other hand, the CoE Convention is not
without its detractors within the European Union, based both on substantive grounds, see, e.g.,
Eurochamnbres Asks Commission and Member States Not to Sign the Convention on Civil Liability, Agence
Europe, June 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Txtlne Library, Txprim File, and on the perception that the
European Union is ahead of the Council of Europe on these issues, see EC Expected to Approve 'Green
Paper' on CivilLiabilityfor EnvironmentalDamage, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 156, 156 (Mar. 10, 1993)
(quoting Brussels-based lawyer as stating that "]tihe green paper apparently [is] more detailed.., and
is being taken more seriously" than CoE Convention).
211. Waste Liability Proposal, supra note 196, art. 3.
212. Id. art. 5(1).
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The Waste Liability Proposal's narrow definition of potentially liable
parties precludes an expansive application of joint and several liability.
Paragraph 1(a) of Article 2 states that a producer is "any person who, in the
course of a commercial or industrial activity, produces waste." 21 3 Paragraph
2 of the same Article, however, provides a list of those who "shall be deemed
to be the producer of the waste in place of the person defined in paragraph
l(a)."214 This list covers importers as well as transporters of waste where
the transporter can not identify the original producer, and, most important, it
includes "the person responsible for the [facility] where the waste was
lawfully transferred to such [facility]."215 In other words, when waste
generators lawfully dispose of waste at licensed facilities, they transfer their
liability for that waste as well. 2 '6 By the terms of the proposal, this liability
is always transferred with the waste unless the facility operator can
demonstrate that the generator has deceived him as to the nature of the
waste;217 even contractual arrangements limiting the transfer of liability are
specifically disallowed.218
The transferability of liability to the facility operator is reinforced by the
Green Paper's concept of "channelling liability" to the party "having the
expertise, resources, and operational control to carry out the most effective
risk management. "219 The Green Paper proposes liability channelling as one
solution to high litigation costs and the "deep pocket" effect traditionally
associated with joint and several liability. 22
A major shortcoming of the Waste Liability Proposal with respect to
213. Id. art. 2(1)(a). The proposal does not apply to nuclear waste or to damage caused by oil from
ships at sea in circumstances where those concerns are already regulated. Id. art. 1(2).
214. Id. art. 2(2)(b) (emphasis added).
215. Id. art. 2(2)(c).
216. This issue is muddied somewhat by comments in the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum
released with the original draft of the proposal. In notes explaining Article 2, the Memorandum states that
the additional parties (i.e., importers, transporters, and disposers) "are also considered to be producers
of waste," an interpretation at odds with the "in place of" language in the actual proposal. Explanatory
Memorandum on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste,
COM(89) 282 final, at 7 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Memorandum itself states earlier that "a
producer of waste must retain liability until disposal is ensured under the prescribed conditions." Id. at
3. In addition, the Preamble to the proposal states that "if the waste has been lawfully transferred to an
authorized disposal [facility] ... liability must be transferred." Waste Liability Proposal, supra note 196,
pmbl. The only consistent reading of these assertions is that importers, transporters, and disposers "are
also considered to be producers" in the sense that they take on liability in place of generators rather than
in addition to generators.
217. Waste Liability Proposal, supra note 196, art. 7(1).
218. Id. art. 8.
219. Green Paper, supra note 198, 2.1.3.
220. The term "deep pocket effect" describes the phenomenon of injured parties suing "the party
with the most financial assets first, instead of the party who caused the most damage." Id. 2.1.4.
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remediation is its strictly prospective nature. 2 Taken to its logical
conclusion, this limitation would restrict application of the Waste Liability
Proposal to new landfills - i.e., those that received no waste before the
passage of the directive. Already active sites would be exempt from liability
under the current Proposal merely by virtue of their having received waste
before its passage."
Should the Waste Liability Proposal be amended to avoid exempting
active sites, liability channelling would present a problem in the British
context, since many targeted facility owners would become insolvent under
such a regime.2' Here the Green Paper, as anticipated by the Waste
Liability Proposal,224 presents a significant step forward with its suggestion
of "joint compensation systems," or remediation funds financed by industry
contributions.' Joint compensation systems are proposed for instances of
"authorized pollution";226 circumstances in which it is impossible "to
221. Waste Liability Proposal, supra note 196, art. 13 (stating that directive "shall not apply to
damage... arising from an incident which occurred before the date on which its provisions are
implemented"); see also George Clemon Freeman, Jr. & Kyle E. McSlarrow, The Proposed European
Comnwzity Directive on Civil Liability for Waste: The Inplications for U.S. Superfund Reauthorization
in 1991, 46 Bus. LAW. 1, 8-9 (1990) (citing explanatory memorandum on proposal, which states that
Article 13 "bars retroactive application of the directive").
222. This is due to problems of causation at common law that are not ameliorated by the Waste
Liability Proposal. Article 4 holds that
the burden of proof on the plaintiff, when affirming the causal link between the waste on the
one hand and the damage or impairment of the environment suffered or likely to be suffered
on the other hand ... shall be no higher than the standard burden of proof in civil law.
Waste Liability Proposal, supra note 196, art. 4(c). On its face, this provision is intended to insure that
member states do not make it more difficult to show causation for purposes of waste liability relative to
other types of liability. However, this ignores significant difficulties with demonstrating causation even
under a "standard burden of proof." In particular, where liability is to be imposed only for damage due
to "new" waste (i.e., that deposited after passage of the directive), one required element of any action for
recovery would be a demonstration that the damage claimed resulted from "new" waste. Where both "old"
and "new" waste are present at a landfill, rarely, if ever, would it be possible to attribute the damage
claimed to new waste (to the exclusion of old waste) with sufficient certainty to meet the standard burden
of proof. See infra text accompanying note 268 (noting U.S. courts' acceptance of impossibility of
determining amount of harm caused by each of multiple wastes at given site).
223. Cf. supra note 29 (suggesting that as many as 80% of British landfills do not have financial
ability to withstand proposed EU requirements).
224. The Waste Liability Proposal stated that rules governing situations where liable parties "cannot
be identified" or are "incapable of providing full compensation for the damage ... caused" shall be
determined by the Council "acting on a proposal from the Commission" and that the Commission "shall
study the feasibility of the establishment of a European fund for compensation." Waste Liability Proposal,
supra note 196, art 11(2).
225. Green Paper, supra note 198, 3.0.
226. Id. "Authorized pollution" refers to pollution caused without violating permits or other
government regulations. On this matter, an earlier section of the Green Paper makes a radical suggestion:
"[Ilf the operator has fully disclosed all relevant data for evaluation by the permitting authority and
complied with the standards set in the permit, there may be reasons for holding the public authority - and
ultimately the taxpayer - responsible for ensuing damage." Id. 2.1.5(11). The justifications for this
approach, i.e., providing the operator incentive for full disclosure and permit compliance and the regulator
incentive "to make responsible decisions," id., have little application to existing contamination. In
addition, this concept conflicts directly with the Waste Liability Proposal, which states that "[tihe producer
shall not be relieved of liability by the sole fact that he holds a permit issued by the public authorities."
Waste Liability Proposal, supra note 196, art. 6(2).
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recover all the costs from a liable party with limited financial resources" ;227
and, most important, for remedying "past pollution." 8 Thus, even as it
recognizes elements of the joint compensation fund concept in the Waste
Liability Proposal, 9 the Green Paper directly confronts the deficiencies
presented by the prospective nature of that Proposal.
In addition, the Green Paper outlines other positive features of joint
compensation systems. For example, the "polluter pays" principle could be
implemented by levying fund charges on "the economic sectors most closely
linked to the type of damage needing restoration."" Further, the incentive
for effective risk management inherent in the "polluter pays" principle could
be enhanced by "1l]inking the likelihood of damage to the amount of charges
to be paid.""
As with any contributory compensation system, the fund envisioned by
the Green Paper provides little incentive for responsible behavior where
individual actors expect the fund to bear the consequences of their actions.
Thus, it is significant that the EU Commission did not choose between a
liability regime and a joint compensation scheme but rather proposed a dual
system: "Could one consider an approach where the strengths of civil liability
would come into play and its limitations would be made up for by the
advantages of compensation mechanisms? " 2 Application of a joint
compensation system to fill gaps in the Waste Liability Proposal may provide
an affirmative answer to the question. Nevertheless, important related issues
such as insurability are not addressed in the current framework of the Waste
Liability Proposal.
Whatever financing regime the EU Commission ultimately adopts, the
Waste Liability Proposal anticipates broad remedies. They include injunctions
prohibiting harmful acts or omissions, "ordering the reinstatement of the
environment," or requiring reimbursement of remediation costs. 23
Reasonably, balancing tests limit liability for reimbursement; no
reimbursement will be required for costs that "substantially exceed" the
benefit to the environment or where "alternative measures to the reinstatement
of the environment" could have been taken "at a substantially lower
cost."" Although definitional problems with terms such as "substantially
exceed" and "reinstatement of the environment" 5 are obvious, the
227. Green Paper, supra note 198, 3.0.
228. Id.
229. Id. 3.2.3 (noting Waste Liability Proposal provision for study of a European fund for
compensation); see supra note 224.
230. Green Paper, supra note 198, 3.0.
231. Id. 3.1.3.
232. Id. 4.2, at 28.
233. Waste Liability Proposal, supra note 196, art. 4(1)(b)(iii).
234. Id. art. 4(2).
235. Cf. Green Paper, supra note 198, 2.1.7 (noting "fundamental importance" of "legal definition
of damage to the environment" and of "degree of impact that should be considered environmental
damage").
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inclusion of these provisions indicates a sensitivity to economic constraints on
site remediation.
The Waste Liability Proposal is potentially generous in its recognition of
the public's interest in environmental remediation. Article 4 of the Proposal
states that "[c]ommon interest groups or associations, which have as their
object the protection of nature and the environment, shall have the right...
to seek any remedy [provided herein]," the conditions of which "shall be laid
down by national legislation.""6 Given the British government's traditional
aversion to public participation in environmental policy debates," 7 this
provision alone could have a significant impact on British environmental law.
In summary, the prospective nature of the Waste Liability Proposal
significantly weakens some of its positive aspects such as an economically
sensitive approach to remedies and respect for public concern over landfill
contamination. The Green Paper suggests a potential to remedy this
shortcoming by recognizing the need to address past pollution and by
proposing joint compensation funds in situations where civil liability provides
inadequate solutions. Nonetheless, questions concerning the boundaries of the
concurrent systems of liability and compensation funds remain unanswered,
as do related questions concerning insurability and financial guarantees of
landfills.
2. The Landfill Proposal
The Landfill Proposal, in contrast to the Waste Liability Proposal and the
Green Paper, is striking in its technical complexity. For example, annexes list
requirements for landfill permit applications, minimum groundwater
monitoring programs, and liner permeability standards. In its emphasis on
operating requirements, the Landfill Proposal is prospectively oriented, even
more so than the Waste Liability Proposal."8 However, some aspects of this
proposal are a logical outgrowth of the civil liability debate and represent the
most likely EU resolution of the problem of existing leaking landfills.
At times, the Landfill Proposal recycles provisions of the Waste Liability
Proposal. For example, Article 14 is a near-verbatim copy of the language of
the earlier proposal, with "operator" replacing "producer": "The operator
shall be liable under civil law for the damage and impairment of the
environment caused by the landfilled waste, irrespective of fault on his
part."" Article 12 reinforces this with a provision that "corrective
236. Waste Liability Proposal, supra note 196, art. 4(3). The Green Paper notes that there are
problems with traditional standing rules in the context of environmental litigation and that these rules vary
among the member states, but it leaves these issues unresolved. Green Paper, supra note 198, 2.1.9.
237. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
238. Cf. HC, DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 13, at xxxii ("It is a general failing of the [Landfill
Proposal] that while it is long on the 'input' side of the landfill of waste, it is rather shorter on site
operation, aftercare, and afteruse.").
239. Landfill Proposal, supra note 197, art. 14.
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measures shall be taken, at the expense of the operator," even where they are
"carried out by [the competent] authority. "'24
The Landfill Proposal, however, adds teeth to these provisions by
requiring sites that remain operational after its implementation to obtain
sufficient financial guarantees "to cover the estimated costs of the closure
procedures and aftercare operations of the landfill."24 The aftercare
provisions require, among other things, a groundwater monitoring plan to last
a minimum of thirty years.242 Furthermore, existing sites that do not pass
groundwater tests and meet new liner permeability requirements must be
closed within five years of the implementation of the proposal. 243 As noted
above, as many as eighty percent of the existing UK sites are expected to fail
these tests.244
Although the Article 17 financial guarantee requirement seems to
contemplate coverage of only routine closure procedures and aftercare
operations, the limits on a public Landfill Aftercare Fund required under
Article 18 suggest that the Article 17 guarantee must be broader. The stated
purpose of the fund is "to cover the normal aftercare costs of closed
landfills"245 and to cover expenses "not otherwise recoupable or not covered
by insurance or financial guarantee."246 In particular, "the fund shall not
cover the costs that can be directly charged to the landfill operator as long as
he is liable."247 Thus, if the new liability net woven by the Waste Liability
Proposal and the Green Paper is cast broadly, financial guarantees under
Article 17 will amount to compulsory insurance for landfill contamination. 24
Indeed, the Green Paper provides an extensive discussion of the "problem
of insurability," including the pros and cons of compulsory insurance. 249
The Green Paper particularly notes the positive regulatory nature of
compulsory insurance: "[R]isk evaluation by the insurance industry is
beneficial, since it reduces the risk of environmental damage."" At the
240. Id. art. 12(3).
241. Id. art. 17.
242. Id. art. 13(3), (5)(a) (noting that groundwater monitoring on biannual basis may be required
"for as long as needed if the site poses an active risk").
243. Id. art. 15(4). The five-year grace period could be reduced by Parliament, given that the House
of Commons Environment Committee feels it is merely "five years' pollution time." HC, DRAFr
DIRECTIVE, supra note 13, at xxxiii.
244. HC, DRAFT DIRECrivE, supra note 13, at xx.
245. Landfill Proposal, supra note 197, art. 18(2)(a) (emphasis added).
246. Id. art. 18(2)(b).
247. Id. art. 18(3).
248. This interaction among the three proposals, fragmented as it may be, was probably intended
by the EU Commission. Evidence of this design lies in the requirement that Landfill Aftercare Funds be
financed by a direct tax on the "types and tonnage of the waste landfilled." Id. art. 18(4). This
requirement corresponds perfectly to the Green Paper's policy of linking the likelihood of damage to the
amount of charges to be paid to a joint compensation system. Green Paper, supra note 198, 3.0. This
financing scheme reveals that the Landfill Aftercare Fund is just a specific form of the joint compensation
system envisioned by the Green Paper. Cf. id. 3.2.3 (noting Landfill Aftercare Fund requirement of
Landfill Proposal).
249. Green Paper, supra note 198, 2.1.11.
250. Id. at 13.
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same time, the EU Commission recognizes that this result is not guaranteed,
particularly under the current state of affairs, as "not all insurers have the
technology or capacity yet for providing [environmental insurance
coverage]."" Further potential problems noted include the unpredictable
costs of remediation, which might exceed the insured's coverage, 2 and the
flight of larger companies (implicitly, and somewhat questionably, assumed
to be better insurance risks) to self-insurance schemes, leaving "small and
medium sized enterprises (SME) - those most in need of liability insurance
for environmental damage - . . . with less economic leverage to fight
expensive premiums. " " The Green Paper does nothing to resolve these
issues beyond noting that "[s]tate intervention may be necessary if private
insurers do not provide [adequate] insurance coverage . . . or if premiums are
too high for SMEs," with little elaboration of what that intervention may
entail32 4
As noted above, the Waste Liability Proposal and the Landfill Proposal
are to some extent currently on hold. In addition, the ambitious scope of the
Green Paper does not bode well for an early conclusion of the general liability
debate, particularly in light of early EU reactions to the Green Paper."
However, trends evident in the evolution of the proposals currently on the
table bring into focus a rough outline of a likely EU regime for financing
landfill remediation. This regime will undoubtedly entail a system of operator
liability complemented by financial guarantees or insurance along with joint
compensation funds. Still, crucial details concerning how these features will
interact to provide adequate funding for remediation remain unclear.
Similarly, incentives for the appropriate risk management of existing as well
as future landfills remain to be specified.
B. U.S. Lessons
U.S. common law has traditionally been no more effective than British
common law in providing a mechanism to fund site remediationY 6 Congress
251. Id. at 12.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 13.
254. Id. The Green Paper goes on to state: "One feature of such intervention might be to avoid
creating unjustified discrimination between firms or imposing obligations which vary according to company
size." Id. This only begs the question at the heart of all compulsory insurance schemes, namely, what
degree of political intervention may be tolerated without destroying the desirable economic incentives
provided by a functional insurance system.
255. EC Dives into Environmental Liability Debate, supra note 199 ("Initial responses to the EC
green paper.. . suggest that long-term resolution of the issues at Community level could still be a long
way off.").
256. "Existing state tort laws present a convoluted maze of requirements... that make it extremely
difficult for a victim to be compensated for damages. A clear, uniform federal law defining a victim's
cause of action in these areas is sorely needed. . . ." INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE COMM.
REPORT, supra note 34, at 63-64, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6140-41 (comments of Rep. Albert
Gore, Jr.).
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attempted to provide the needed tools in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or
Superfund)," 7 amended by the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA)." Since the first reports of the plight of victims of
improper waste disposal at Love Canal, 9 the often emotional terms of the
remediation debate have prevented the development of a consensus on many
fundamental issues.26' As a result, CERCLA has been criticized as a
"muddle of inconsistent and sometimes conflicting social goals." 261
While this "muddle" of goals includes both deterrence and remediation,
Superfund as applied has achieved at best mixed results in their attainment.
As we shall see, CERCLA's in terrorem deterrence has produced incentives
counter to notions of environmental protection, and potentially significant
sources of remediation financing have been bound up in extended litigation.
The following section outlines these issues in the context of the major features
of Superfund law and the U.S. EPA's strategies to implement that law.262
1. CERCLA Liability
CERCLA makes waste generators, transporters, and owners or operators
of waste disposal sites liable for costs of remedial action and damages to
natural resources due to the release of hazardous substances. 263 The standard
of this liability, defined indirectly by reference to Section 311 of the Clean
Water Act,264 has resulted in the imposition of strict joint and several
liability unless defendants can demonstrate that the harm their wastes have
caused is divisible.265 CERCLA specifically allows the government to
institute remedial actions266 with the intent of subsequent recovery under this
liability regime.267 As a result, the term "plaintiff" in this context often
257. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982
& Supp. IV 1992)).
258. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
259. See supra note 1.
260. This situation may be changing. See infra notes 304-306 and accompanying text for a discussion
of growing public participation in the Superfund debate.
261. Elliott, supra note 6, at 48. Even commentators with the advantage of hindsight cannot agree
on what the objectives of Superfund are or should be. Cf. Cummings, supra note 7, at 11 (claiming
primary objective is deterrence); CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 66, at 36 (remediation of threats to
public health and restoration of natural resources); Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World
Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (all of the above and more).
262. In addition to the deterrent effects provided by CERCLA and discussed in detail below,
Congress has attempted to prevent pollution at operational waste disposal facilities through extensive
regulatory involvement mandated by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For a discussion of RCRA, see, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 214-87.
263. 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32). Section 311 of the Clean Water Act is codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1321
(1982).
265. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 301.
266. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1), (c)(1)(B)-(C).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
384 [Vol. 19: 349
An American Werewolf in London
means the U.S. EPA.
Placing the burden on defendants - or, in CERCLA parlance, potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) - to show that the harm caused by their waste is
divisible renders it practically impossible for responsible parties to escape
joint and several liability, as "courts regularly findi- that where wastes of
varying (and unknown) degrees of toxicity and migratory potential commingle,
it simply is impossible to determine the amount of environmental harm caused
by each party."26 As a result, if the plaintiff can show that a defendant has
contributed even one drum to a contaminated site, that defendant technically
could be held responsible for the entire cleanup cost.269 Joint and several
application of CERCLA liability thus can serve both deterrence and
remediation purposes.
Strict liability in many cases also serves both purposes. Where the
plaintiff is relieved of the obligation to prove "that hazardous substances were
released as the result of negligence or that the defendant's conduct was
intentional and unreasonable,"27 funds will be more readily available for
remediation, and waste managers will be more careful to avoid environmental
damage.
CERCLA's definition of liable persons is so broad that Congress clearly
anticipated situations where liability would primarily serve remediation, rather
than deterrence, purposes. These definitions repeatedly refer to past behavior
with no reference to a limiting time frame.27 As a result, CERCLA applies
retroactively, and liability can arise from actions taken before the passage of
the law that, at the time, did not result in liability.272 To be sure, large
judgments imposed under retroactive liability can enhance deterrence as well
to the extent that they command the attention of the regulated community and
thus further the in terrorem effect of the CERCLA regime. Still, retroactive
liability is an imperfect tool for deterrence;273 the primary intent of these
provisions is to supply funds for remediation. Unfortunately, in practice
268. O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (lst Cir. 1989).
269. In an attempt to soften this seemingly harsh result, Congress included de minimis settlement
provisions in SARA under which the EPA may settle with a PRP "if such settlement involves only a minor
portion of the response costs" and if the settling party meets other requirements related to its relative
contribution to site impairment. SARA § 122(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)).
270. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 302.
271. Specifically, a site owner/operator is defined as "any person who at the time of disposal...
owned or operated any facility," 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (emphasis added); generators as "any person
who ... arranged for disposal or treatment," id. § 9607(a)(3); and transporters as "any person who
accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport," id. § 9607(a)(4).
272. Beyond applying solely to the past behavior of defendants, CERCLA's retroactive liability has
also been interpreted to give the government authority to recover response costs incurred prior to the
enactment of CERCLA. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d at 176. For a discussion of the judicial
construction of retroactive liability and other aspects of CERCLA case law, see generally David E. Jones
& Kyle E. McSlarrow ... But Were Afraid to Ask: Superfund Case Law, 1981-1989, 19 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,430 (1989).
273. See Freeman & McSlarrow, supra note 221, at 7 ("Commentators have long recognized that
social costs can virtually never be 'internalized' retroactively.") (citations omitted).
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CERCLA liability is known more for fostering extended and costly
litigation274 than for financing remediation.
Emphasizing the deterrence objectives of Superfund, one congressional
staff member who helped draft CERCLA and SARA has stated, "It was a
conscious intention of the law's authors to draw lenders and insurers into this
new army of quasi-regulators."275 However clear this intent might once have
been, the text of the final legislation does not reflect it.276 Indeed, insurers
have spent far more resources litigating this ambiguity than remediating waste
sites, 2' suggesting that there has been precious little commitment to "quasi-
regulation." CERCLA has provided no deterrence through policing by the
insurance industry.
Furthermore, the combination of retroactive and joint and several liability
produces a deep pocket effect that encourages further pollution. Any amount
of waste disposed at a site at any time in the site's history renders the
generator of that waste fully responsible for all cleanup costs at that site.
Under CERCLA, a generator must seek contribution from other PRPs for
costs incurred beyond its "fair share."278 As a result, the EPA, when
pursuing private funding for cleanup projects, has incentives to identify only
so many deep pocket plaintiffs as needed to provide funding for
remediation.279 This in turn provides incentives for financially secure
organizations to continue to use the same waste disposal sites rather than
expand liability by entering new sites, even where potential problems at the
existing sites are evident, and even where the risk of uncontrolled pollution
at new sites is greatly diminished by modern design and operating
techniques.28 These same incentives induce potentially responsible "deep
274. See infra notes 307-310 and accompanying text for a discussion of the costs of litigation
associated with CERCLA.
275. Cummings, supra note 7, at 11. Mr. Cummings was chief counsel of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works during the drafting of CERCLA and minority counsel during the
development of SARA. Id.
276. See, e.g., James L. Knoll & Randy L. Arthur, Property Insurance: No Solution for Pollution,
17 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 231, 307 (1990) (arguing that Congress clearly "did not intend that insurers
should bear the expense of cleaning up environmental pollution").
277. A survey of four national insurance companies gave the following breakdown of total CERCLA
expenses between 1986 and 1989: 42% for coverage disputes (which "arise when the insurance company
and the policyholder disagree on the applicability of the policy"); 37% for legal costs of defending
policyholders; 12% for indemnity payments (i.e., direct remediation expenses); and 9% on internal
administrative costs. JAN PAUL ACTON & LLOYD S. DIXON, SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS: THE
EXPERIENCES OF INSURERS AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS 21-24 (1992).
278. Equitable factors such as "a limited degree of participation in waste disposal activities.., are
relevant in subsequent actions for contribution. They are not pertinent to the question of joint and several
liability." United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 n.22 (4th Cir. 1988). The right of
contribution implied by the courts was codified in SARA § 113(0 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0).
279. See supra note 220 (citing Green Paper's recognition of "deep pocket effect").
280. The author is personally aware of at least one major corporation that utilizes only hazardous
waste facilities used in the past. Decisions concerning non-hazardous waste disposal at a "new" facility,
though less formalized, are often based primarily on the potential paper trail left by the disposal. These
are classic examples of undesirable regulatory avoidance behavior. See also Colin Hugh Buckley, A
Suggested Remedy for Toxic Injury: Class Actions, Epidemiology, and Economic Efficiency, 26 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 497, 501 (1985) (noting generators' increasing use of "hazardous waste 'black market' to
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pockets" to resist the closure of an unsound facility, thereby postponing
CERCLA application as long as possible in order to delay liability expenses
they feel they will ultimately have to pay anyway. Thus some aspects of
retroactive liability are actually antithetical to the deterrence goals of
Superfund.
The liability provisions of CERCLA therefore provide some deterrence
through their in terrorem effect at the same time that they encourage the
continued use of existing waste sites regardless of the environmental risk those
sites pose. Although these provisions in theory could finance remediation, to
date they have earned a greater reputation for generating litigation.
CERCLA's application of liability to past generators of waste is often
justified by the seemingly unassailable "polluter pays" principle. Put bluntly,
equity demands that polluters who profited from past transgressions return
those profits for the cause of remediation. However, close inspection of this
rationale reveals severe flaws in its equitable foundation, as well as an out of
hand dismissal of economic efficiency. For example, it is far from clear that
any firm ever received "pollution profits." Assuming that past waste
generators operated in competitive markets, any past cost savings from
improper disposal practices were necessarily passed on to consumers of the
generators' products. Objections to this assertion necessarily imply that the
"pollution profiteers" had unusual market power, not that they employed
unusually polluting practices. In a very real sense, then, the true "profiteers"
of past improper waste disposal practices are all of us, society in general.
Congress, however, found it more politically palatable to aim CERCLA at
faceless organizations that are easily vilified.
A further inequity of retroactive liability is that it punishes businesses for
their success. Given that all firms followed uniformly bad waste management
practices, only those that have survived to this day may be held liable for sins
of the past.28' More important, though, is the inefficiency resulting from the
selective application of CERCLA to those businesses still solvent. In practice,
Superfund liability is random; some businesses will be targeted for recovery
by the EPA, while others with similar past waste disposal practices will not.
The allocation of liability is more likely to depend on the ease of identifying
barrels at a site than on a firm's application of shoddy waste management
standards twenty years ago. As a result, some firms will bear the costs of
everyone's past misdeed and be placed at a competitive disadvantage, with
little regard for relative culpability.
CERCLA's retroactive liability, already found wanting on deterrence and
remediation grounds, is thus questionable on its own equitable terms as well.
cut costs").
281. Potentially liable businesses could still be solvent because they unfairly benefitted from waste
disposal "on the cheap" in the past, but such an assertion cannot be found in legislative records or the
general literature. Indeed, given the complexity of modern business, it is unlikely that the assertion could
be substantiated in more than a few isolated cases, if at all.
1994]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2. The Superfund
In addition to modifying the application of common law liability rules to
the remediation of contaminated sites, CERCLA established a fund282 to
finance emergency government "removal operations."" 3 This fund allows
EPA action
[w]henever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such
a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of release into
the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and
substantial danger to the public health or welfare.2
This emergency response capability is normally limited to a maximum of $2
million total in funds and twelve months total response time per site. These
limitations do not apply where "immediate risk[s] to public health or welfare
or the environment" exist that "will not otherwise be [remedied] on a timely
basis."28' This exception also permits funding of "orphan sites" where no
solvent responsible parties can be found. These emergency response powers
have been cited as a "largely unheralded aspect of Superfund . . . responsible
for the relatively speedy elimination of most of the worst dangers posed by




In addition to emergency removal operations, the EPA may initiate
"remedial actions" for permanent site cleanup with Superfund moneys and
recover later under the liability rules discussed above. 287 Thus, to the extent
those rules provide deterrence, such deterrence is promoted indirectly by EPA
use of the Superfund. However, the size of the fund indicates that Congress
placed considerable value on site remediation, regardless of deterrence.88
282. Hence, the nickname "Superfund," often applied generically to all of CERCLA and its
amendments.
283. In CERCLA parlance, "removal" actions are distinct from "remedial actions"; the latter term
"means those actions consistent with permanent remedy." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (defining "remedy" and
"remedial action"); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (defining "remove" and "removal"); see infra text
accompanying note 287 (discussing CERCLA funding of remedial actions).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
285. In addition, this section is premised upon the fact that "continued response actions are
immediately required to prevent, limit, or mitigate an emergency." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1).
286. CHURCH & NAKAMuRA, supra note 66, at 5; cf. Elliott, supra note 6, at 13 (contrasting large
number of efficiently performed EPA "removal actions" with extended "bureaucratic process" of
negotiating permanent remediation plans).
287. See supra notes 266-267 and accompanying text.
288. SARA § 111(a), (i) (codified at42 U.S.C. § 9611(a), (p)) authorized expenditures of up to $8.5
billion over five years, the majority of which was to come from a per-ton tax on the sales of specified
chemicals established by the Hazardous Substance Response Revenue Act of 1980, CERCLA § 201 etseq.
(codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
extended these appropriation arrangements for three years through fiscal year 1994. Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 6301, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-319 (1990); cf. supra note 192 (noting inability of British NRA "to carry
out remedial works and recover the costs from the polluter... given the lack of financial means to carry
out the initial cleanup operations").
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3. Abatement Orders
Although EPA typically initiates a cleanup project with Superfund moneys
and follows with a civil suit for recovery of costs,289 CERCLA provides
another strategy for site remediation: the EPA may directly order responsible
parties to initiate cleanup themselves.29 This power is explicitly enforceable
in federal court.29 SARA set the maximum fine for violating or refusing to
comply with an abatement order at $25,000 per day.292
SARA also allowed persons complying with abatement orders to file suit
for reimbursement from Superfund for costs that are "reasonable in light of
the action required by the relevant order."293 Reimbursement is available
only where the party subject to the order can "establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that it is not liable for response costs under [42 U.S.C.]
section 9607(a)." 294 A party defying an abatement order must also meet at
least this standard to establish "sufficient cause" for such defiance and avoid
the increased fines.295 As noted above, Section 9607 liability renders even
de minimis polluters potentially liable for all cleanup costs. Thus, the SARA
amendments significantly enlarge the stick EPA has available to enforce
abatement orders and thereby potentially further both remediation and
deterrence goals.
4. Public Participation
Congress' allowance of a significant level of public participation in the
Superfund regulatory process stands in stark contrast to the typical British
approach. In addition to private rights of action under Section 9607 against
parties responsible for the release of hazardous substances29 6 and allowance
of private claims against the Superfund under Section 9612,297 CERCLA
imposes other requirements in furtherance of public participation in the
regulatory process.
With regard to specific sites, SARA requires that the EPA publish
relevant information before and after the adoption of a remedial action plan
289. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 363.
290. 42 U.S.C. § 9606.
291. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
292. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1), amended by SARA § 109(b). This is a dramatic increase over the
$5000 per day fine originally imposed by CERCLA § 106(b).
293. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(C), added by SARA § 106(3).
294. Id.
295. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1), (2)(C).
296. For a discussion of private actions under CERCLA, see Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple:
An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, 45 BUs. LAw. 923, 937-41 (1990).
297. But cf. Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1497-98
(1986) (noting inadequacy of such provisions due to "cumbersome procedural standards for section [96121
claims and vague pre-cleanup conditions for section 196071 actions").
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and that it accept public comments during the plan's development. 298 Further
publication is required to explain subsequent developments that differ "in any
significant respects from the final plan."299 The EPA may make technical
assistance grants of up to $50,000 "to any group of individuals which may be
affected by a release" so that they may "obtain technical assistance in
interpreting information" concerning any aspect of the CERCLA action.3"
Section 9605 requires annual publication and revision of a National
Priorities List (NPL). The NPL was originally to contain "[to the extent
practicable, at least four hundred of the highest priority facilities,"301 as well
as a "hazard ranking system" used to identify those facilities.2 SARA also
enhanced public access to this process by allowing "[a]ny person who is, or
may be, affected by a release" to petition to have a site evaluated under the
hazard ranking system. 3
This trend of increasing public participation in the CERCLA process has
reached a new level in the warm-up for the next round of Superfund
reauthorization exercises. Amid a flurry of proposed amendments, the Clinton
Administration's plan has been lauded as "a good foundation for a new law"
precisely because it "sought input from a wide variety of interest groups and
tried to reach consensus positions. "34 Groups consulted include
representatives from industry, government, academia, and environmental
organizations. 3" The proposal itself supports substantial public participation
in waste site remediation.3es Such extraordinary emphasis on a broad-based
consensus at all stages of the process reflects a realization that public
involvement in the waste site remediation debate is essential in a democratic
society. Beyond the technical issues of liability and remediation schemes, this
clearly is a lesson the British should take from our fourteen years of
experience with CERCLA.
298. SARA § 117 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a)-(b)).
299. 42 U.S.C. § 9617(c).
300. 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e). For an elementary discussion of the scientific and engineering issues
involved in waste site remediation, see Melvyn Kopstein, Science for Superjund Lawyers, 19 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,388 (1989).
301. This requirement was amended by SARA § 105(a)(3)(A) to require merely that "the highest
priority facilities shall be designated." 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B). This change was likely due to
congressional realization that it had seriously underestimated the number of sites ultimately covered by
CERCLA. By the time of the consideration of SARA, the Office of Technology Assessment had estimated
that Superfund sites across the nation may number as high as 10,000. This estimate included a variety of
contaminated sites beyond just waste disposal sites. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986, H. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 54-55 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837.
302. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c). The hazard ranking system occupies over a hundred pages of the Code
of Federal Regulations. The NPL listed 1078 facilities, not including federally owned sites, in October
1992. 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1993).
303. SARA § 105(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d)).
304. Superfund Reauthorization, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1663, 1664 (Jan. 21, 1994).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1665 (noting that proposal "calls for community groups to be established to participate
in the remedy selection process and identify likely future uses of sites" to determine appropriate level of
remediation).
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5. CERCLA Implementation Strategies
At home and abroad, CERCLA is perhaps best known for its vast appetite
for legal resources. 7 One recent estimate places average transaction
costs - primarily legal fees - at $4 million per site; by comparison, actual
cleanup costs average $25 million2 8 Indeed, the liability scheme of
CERCLA has been charged with having "palpable effects on [the]
competitiveness" of U.S. industry in international markets." 9 SARA, the
only major legislative retooling of CERCLA to date, has not altered these
trends.3"' While a Clinton Administration proposal has recently rekindled
hope that the Superfund may yet be reformed,31' the glaring deficiencies of
CERCLA's past have not been lost on the Europeans, who typically regard
the U.S. experience only as an example of bad environmental regulation.312
Such dismissal is myopic in light of the "uniquely varied kit of alternative
statutory tools" 313 that Congress provided the EPA for cleaning up impaired
sites. EPA's use of this tool kit varies widely from site to site. Recent
research suggests that the EPA's varying approach, partly a result of a lack
of concrete guidance on the policy priorities of Superfund,314 is also affected
by many site-specific factors, including site size and complexity, nature of
responsible parties, and, surprisingly, the EPA regional office responsible for
supervising the cleanup. 35 The different implementation strategies have been
307. See Jones & McSlarrow, supra note 272, at 10,430 ("[Oltherwise known as the full
employment act for lawyers, [CERCLA] has generated a prodigious amount of litigation since its
enactment in 1980.").
308. Turner T. Smith, Jr., EC Environmental Regulation, Address Before the American Foreign Law
Association 12 (May 28, 1991) (transcript on file with author). Another study of five Fortune 100
companies active in Superfund sites found that transaction costs for those firms ranged between 15 and
31% of all Superfuind costs. ACTON & DIXON, supra note 277, at xiv.
309. Freeman & McSlarrow, supra note 221, at 2 ("[Ihe structural inefficiencies associated with
our regime invite protracted litigation and perpetuate the misdirection of resources.").
310. This is so for two reasons. First, SARA was largely a congressional effort to codify then-
existing case law. Second, the sections where Congress did attempt to innovate are primarily concerned
with issues that occur later in remediation projects, a stage rarely reached so far. Jones & McSlarrow,
supra note 272, at 10,431. What might have been a second extensive reexamination of Superfund in 1990
did not live up to expectations. In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Congress extended
Superfund through fiscal year 1994 but made no substantive changes in the law. Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 6103, 104 Stat. at 1388-319 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (Supp. IV 1992)).
311. See, e.g., Not So Super Supeoiund, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1994, at A16 (commenting that "[lt
is hard to think of a government program with a wider gulf between ambitions and results than Superfund"
and supporting the Clinton Administration's "promising plan to redo that law").
312. See, e.g., EC: Clean-Up Laws Have Similarities to Superfund Legislation in the US According
to Davies Arnold Cooper, LONDON POST MAG., Oct. 10, 1991, at 4 (noting "frightening parallels"); Neil
Hawke & Susan Nudds, Insurance and the Enforcement of Waste Disposal Laws, 17 ANGLo-AM. L. REV.
239, 250 (1988) ("[T]he success of insurance-based regulation will depend, in part, on an avoidance of
some of the excesses and uncertainties of the American system."); ECAction on Environmental Liability
Could Repeat US Errors, Conference Told, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 429 (July 1, 1992).
313. CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 66, at 17.
314. Indeed, "[a]s a nation we have been unable to decide [what] the goal[s] of the Superfuind
program [are]." Elliott, supra note 6, at 13.
315. See generally CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 66. The last variable is said to be a result
of, among other things, "the personality and occupational background of regional administrators; the size,
complexity, and configuration of PRPs at typical Superfund sites; and the constraints placed on program
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characterized as the prosecution, accommodation, and public works
approaches. t6
a. Prosecution
The prosecution approach places "an emphasis on coercion and a reliance
upon the legal power of the government to command compliance."" 7 This
substantial power includes potential fines and the even more serious threat of
joint and several liability. Prosecution is perhaps most effective at minimizing
taxpayer expense where solvent parties may be found, although judicial
requirements of agency reasonableness make it unlikely that any site could be
remediated under complete government coercion."' Moreover, the
adversarial nature of this approach introduces significant inefficiencies, not
limited to litigation costs, that increase the overall cost of remediation. For
example, the government typically pursues the prosecution strategy against a
limited number of deep pocket defendants and thereby avoids the costs of
identifying additional PRPs. These expenses, however, are only transferred
to the PRPs named by the EPA. These parties, lacking the information
gathering and police powers available to the EPA, must resort to the courts
to pursue additional PRPs, thereby increasing aggregate transaction costs.
b. Accommodation
In contrast to prosecution, the accommodation approach emphasizes what
is in the interest of both the EPA and the PRPs, namely, "settlement,
selection of an appropriate remedy, and equitable allocation of costs."" 9
While this tactic can lead to a faster remediation program, its hallmark is
minimized transaction costs. Because the EPA and named defendants approach
the remediation problem in a spirit of cooperation, negotiations tend to be less
costly and the flow of information smoother than in a more adversarial
situation.320
Nevertheless, the accommodation strategy may sacrifice other values in
order to secure the voluntary involvement of PRPs. A single-minded
determination to minimize taxpayer expenses, for instance, will poison the
cooperative spirit vital to the success of this approach. Moreover, the greater
implementation by state environmental policy." Id. at 13 (footnote omitted).
316. Id. at 10-12.
317. Id. at 24.
318. Id. at 127 ("[Wihile the federal government holds most of the legal cards in this judicial
showdown, it still must convince a federal judge that it is acting both within the law - the easy part -
and reasonably. The requirement of at least the appearance of government reasonableness emerges not
from the statutory language of Superfund .... but from ... judicial imperatives.").
319. Id. at 28 (quoting AT&T ET AL., SUPERFUND FROM THE INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE: SUGGESTIONS
TO IMPROvE AND EXPEDITE THE SUPERFUND REMEDIATION PROCESS 1-2 (1989)).
320. See id. at 28.
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emphasis on PRP participation is likely to leave a more limited role for other
potentially interested parties, such as affected citizens.
c. Public Works
The public works approach casts the EPA in the dual role of an active
remediator and a bill collector. Under this tactic, the EPA proceeds as it sees
fit, without prior negotiations. The public works strategy provides the
speediest remedy available, leaving cost recovery for later consideration. 321
Because the strategy allows only after-the-fact involvement of the parties
ultimately presented with the bill, however, it entails transaction costs that are
potentially large relative to remediation costs. These costs include EPA
expenditures to maintain documentation that will withstand judicial review in
actions to recover costs, as well as ex post litigation among PRPs to establish
the final allocation of liability.322 Thus, this approach is limited primarily
to sites where removal actions, as opposed to remedial actions, 3  are
feasible. 324 As a result, a public works approach at "relatively small,
noncomplex sites ... may minimize transaction costs," although perhaps to
no greater extent than an accommodation approach.32
One common thread shared by all approaches to implementing CERCLA
is EPA's ever-present "gorilla in the closet," the coercive tools provided by
Congress. 326 Regarding deterrence, these tools provide perverse incentives
in some aspects, such as the inducement of deep pockets' continued use of old
sites over new, safer ones, and completely overlook asserted goals in others,
such as the failure to enlist lenders and insurers as quasi-regulators. Still, by
imposing headline-grabbing monetary penalties on the regulated community
they do deter waste mismanagement to some extent. Nonetheless, although
EPA emergency removal operations have been praised for their efficiency and
speed, the system is widely viewed as a failure for its inability to deliver more
permanent remediation, a result often blamed on protracted litigation.
The lesson to be learned from the various implementation strategies of the
EPA is one of flexibility. Every remediation program will face recalcitrant
polluters deserving prosecution, repentant remediators worthy of
accommodation, and orphan sites requiring public works. The British clearly
may profit from the lessons the United States has learned.
321. Id. at 31.
322. Id. at 134.
323. See supra note 283.
324. CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 66, at 134.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 23.
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VI. A PROPOSAL FOR PARLIAMENT
A. Introduction
Waste regulation, particularly with respect to waste site remediation
liability, is in a great state of flux in the United Kingdom. Its past gives cause
for concern that many seriously polluting sites exist and that many current
operators have neither the technical nor the financial wherewithal to address
that pollution; its present provides no mechanisms to support remediation and
only inadequately deters further contamination; and its future holds certain
upheaval due to EU-mandated legislation and possibly growing public
discontent as well.
The following proposal incorporates these factors in a scheme that
recognizes the necessary coexistence of remediation and deterrence in any
program to address environmental contamination. This necessity is expressed
in a bifurcated system that addresses existing contamination separately from
future contamination. In broad terms, a tax-based remediation fund will
finance the cleanup of past pollution, while strict liability imposed on facility
owners, backed by insurance requirements, will remediate future pollution.
This British system, like any other, will particularly benefit from a clear
delineation of the policy goals that waste site remediation legislation might
address, or at least a clear understanding of the conflicts inherent in those
goals. Parroting the "polluter pays" clichd will not suffice. Ultimately
decisions must be made concerning who, in fact, the "polluters" are, how
much society as a whole is willing to pay to address waste site pollution, and
what level of transaction costs is appropriate for the resolution of these issues.
More specifically, the current state of British regulatory agencies and the
demonstrated attitudes of British courts toward remediation highlight the need
for constructive discussion. With respect to the agencies, widespread
underfunding and demoralization, if left unredressed, will derail any plan
requiring detailed regulatory involvement. Thus, Parliament's solution must,
at the level of substance, give the agencies clear direction on issues with
which they have had no experience and developed no expertise. At the level
of procedure, Parliament must at least provide adequate funding and staffing,
including allowances for start-up costs of a program fraught with uncertainty.
The courts' reluctance to apply sanctions for pollution even in the face of
clear legislative intent suggests that an ideal system should avoid adjudication
wherever possible. The wasted transaction costs of litigation support this goal
as well. To the extent that judicial involvement is unavoidable, however, the
same clear statement of program priorities is crucial.
Much of this proposal depends upon the development of a British
consensus on the goals of the waste site remediation program. For such a
consensus to develop, at least two other conditions must be met: the system
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proposed must produce a substantial amount of information regarding the
condition of existing waste sites, and it must take into account the concerns
of the British public.
Little is known about the business character of most facility owners, and
even less about the physical condition of existing sites. What is known,
including historic waste management and regulation practices, indicates that
a significant number of problem sites exist. Likely EU landfill inspection and
monitoring requirements will require some data gathering. More important,
though, the U.S. experience has demonstrated the peril of attempting to tackle
these issues without some understanding of the size of the problem. It is folly
to attempt to resolve, for example, how much society is willing spend on
waste site cleanup (i.e., how clean is clean) without some concept of how
much might be spent.
As in the United States following the discovery of the Love Canal
tragedy, gathering this information will almost certainly result in public outcry
and pressure for government action.327 The British thus face the risk of
repeating U.S. errors such as imposing liability out of a sense of moral
outrage rather than on economic grounds,2 8 or failing to achieve consensus
on or even clear understanding of the magnitude of the problem. These errors
should put British government and industry on notice of the stakes involved
and the consequent importance of good faith negotiations toward consensus.
The U.S. experience has also shown that public participation in this
process is crucial. The traditional British reliance on genteel industry-
government cooperation is no match for the broad sweep of remediation law,
which affects polluted as well as polluter. Certainly a rush of public scrutiny
risks dampening the pace of deliberation as government and industry become
accustomed to the bright light of public disclosure. But as CERCLA reformers
have come to know, consensus must include citizens' groups, which are part
of the process - whether explicitly invited or not.
The following section outlines a program to be established on a
foundation of British consensus concerning waste site remediation goals and
priorities. This program addresses both remediation and deterrence concerns
through a bifurcated system of tax-based remediation for past pollution along
with a strict liability/insurance scheme for future contamination.
327. In fact, the government's concern over "intensiflied] pressure for measures to strengthen
existing, and inadequate, powers to order the cleanup of land" was responsible for initial delays in the
development of contaminated land registers. Wheeler, supra note 13, at 580. More recently, the
government has repeatedly ruled out these comprehensive national registers, more than likely over the
same concerns. See DoE Attacked, supra note 12, at 653 (noting pressure on government from industry
concerned over cleanup liability); see also Environmental Protection Act, 1990, ch. 43, § 143 (proposing
contaminated land registers at discretion of secretary of state).
328. See, e.g., Highest Court of Appeals Rejects Claim Linked to Strict Retrospective Liability, 16
Int'l Env't Rep. 938, 938 (Dec. 15, 1993) (noting FoE's urging of EU Commission "to act as soon as
possible to impose strict, retrospective, joint and several liability across the European Union to make sure
industry cannot pass the bill for its pollution to the victims of that pollution").
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B. Past Waste Site Contamination: A British Superfund
Much like its U.S. counterpart, the British superfund proposed here is a
government-administered fund financed through taxes purposely chosen to
further the policy goals of the program. To avoid the moral hazard of poor
waste management practices, the fund should finance remediation only for
past harms at sites where operations have ceased. Nevertheless, the British
superfund should be the sole financier of a much broader scope of remediation
of past harms than the U.S. Superfund.
1. Justification
A tax-based fund primarily encourages prompt remediation of impaired
sites. The EPA's success in quickly implementing removal actions through
Superfund financing demonstrates the efficacy of this approach. In addition,
the absence of "pollution profits" and the inherently uneven application of
retroactive liability provide equitable arguments that favor a superfund over
liability for remediating past harms. Moreover, retroactive liability is
technology-impeding, at least with respect to larger firms that might otherwise
be in the best position to advance technology. The deep pocket effect
encourages these firms to stay in old sites, even if those sites are leaking and
new sites are not.
In addition, publicly funded waste site remediation avoids the
astronomical transaction costs of extended litigation - arguably the greatest
evil of retroactive liability. Where the money spent comes from a government-
administered common fund, private parties have little incentive to litigate the
allocation of responsibility or the selection of appropriate remedies. 29 This
approach has the added benefit of minimizing the involvement of British
courts, which are of dubious reliability in enforcing environmental statutes.
One of the major flaws in the initial planning of CERCLA was a lack of
understanding of the magnitude of the problem the program would ultimately
address. Public funding of site remediation, particularly where followed by the
imposition of strict liability, is akin to a regulatory forgiveness program that
provides an incentive for owners of impaired sites to register contamination
in hopes of avoiding future liability. This registration will improve early
recalibration of the program and potentially avoid extended start-up delays and
expenses.
Finally, broad CERCLA-style retroactive liability applied to generators
has not been suggested as a realistic policy alternative, either in Britain or the
European Union. Should the stringent requirements of the Landfill Proposal
become law, many public sites and less stable private sites will thus become
329. Obviously no solution can reduce transaction costs to zero. Issues of agency efficiency and
representativeness are addressed below.
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burdens on the British public purse through bankruptcy and closure at any
rate.
2. Sources of Revenue
Funding for the preliminary social insurance scheme should be modeled
after CERCLA's Superfund provisions, which selectively tax hazardous
chemicals. This arrangement, if properly structured, could serve many
purposes beyond raising revenue. Because the tax would apply to all
chemicals that are known or suspected contributors to environmental pollution,
the burden of the remediation fund would be widely borne by nearly all
industrial actors, who are then equally well positioned to spread the costs.330
In addition, adopting a volumetric base for the tax and adjusting the tax
rate according to the relative risk of harm associated with each chemical, as
was done by CERCLA, could ensure that expenses are concentrated in
industries responsible for the greatest risks. Besides its obvious equitable
appeal, such a scheme would provide incentives for industry to minimize use
of the most harmful chemicals wherever possible. A waste disposal tax based
on the waste type and volume, suggested in the Landfill Proposal,331 would
have the added effect of encouraging waste minimization in both industrial and
domestic settings. A remediation tax would thus be a much more efficient
implementation of the "polluter pays" principle than retroactive liability.
On the other hand, CERCLA's environmental tax scheme will require
modification to suit the British situation. The Superfund was designed to
generate resources for a program more limited in scope than the one proposed
here, and was expected to be replenished through recovery against solvent
defendants. The taxes must therefore be adjusted if the British fund is to cover
all sites deemed too contaminated to continue operations. In addition, casting
the tax net further would enhance deterrent effects.
3. Limitations
A clear disadvantage of the remediation fund is its inability to deter
prospective harms. Where pollution is remedied through a common fund
supported by contributions unrelated to the level of pollution caused by each
contributor, the contributors will have little incentive to reduce contamination.
The fund presented here should therefore be strictly limited to facilities where
impairment has already occurred and where operations that might lead to
330. Of course, to a certain extent this tax suffers a flaw of CERCLA liability noted above, namely,
that only surviving firms are subject to it. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. However, the tax
would be levied on chemicals used by all existing firms, and would thus be less random in its effect than
CERCLA liability. A remediation tax would not disadvantage any existing British firm vis-A-vis another
existing firm.
331. Landfill Proposal, supra note 197, art. 18.
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future harms have ceased. Issues of identifying such sites and enforcing
discontinuation of operations are discussed below.
Finally, the imposition of specific taxes on chemical products could raise
claims of trade interference, and should thus be measured carefully against
EU tax standards. This problem should not prove insurmountable, as the EU
Commission has in the past shown flexibility in applying competition rules
where environmental insurance is concerned.332
C. Future Waste Site Contamination: Strict Liability
Imposing strict liability for future contamination deters prospective
environmental harms. The strict liability system proposed here limits
potentially responsible parties to landfill owners/operators and their insurers
in order to reduce transaction costs, ensure financial accountability, and
promote industry regulation by the insurance industry.
1. Justification
The imposition of strict liability emphasizes the deterrence goals of
environmental regulation. Where industrial actors understand that they will be
held responsible for damages resulting from improper disposal of waste
regardless of fault, they will take appropriate preventive measures,
particularly where prevention is substantially cheaper than cure.
In the United States, CERCLA imposes strict liability on a wide range of
actors involved in the commerce of hazardous waste: generators, transporters,
and disposers. The advantages of including generators in this scheme are
increased policing of waste facilities by generators, a significantly increased
pool of remediation funds, and deterrence of illicit dumping. Disadvantages
include increased transaction costs of litigation for cost recovery against
multiple defendants, particularly in suits for contribution where issues of
relative fault are impossible to resolve definitively. In addition, liability for
generators is not the only, or even the most efficient, means of increasing
private policing of waste sites, or of providing adequate funding to remedy
contamination that has occurred.
The European Union's Waste Liability Proposal suggests that the benefits
of generator liability might be more efficiently captured by allowing
generators to transfer their liability to a licensed facility upon legal transfer
of their waste. Because the proposal imposes responsibility for wastes on
generators up to the time of transfer, the deterrence of illicit dumping is much
332. EC Cites Environment in Exempting Insurance Schemefrom Competition Rules, 15 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 35, 35 (Jan. 29, 1992). Still, there are limits to the EU Commission's permissiveness in this
regard; the exemption reported here was apparently predicated on the fact that this private re-insurance
pool's "market share was not enough to seriously disrupt competition." Id.
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the same as that under CERCLA: both programs focus sanctions for illegal
dumping on generators, who are best positioned to control this stage of the
waste management cycle. In addition, the Waste Liability Proposal allows the
disposer's liability to revert to the generator upon a demonstration that the
generator deceived the disposer about the nature of the waste.333 Because the
generator is in the best position to provide this information, this provision
should be strengthened with sanctions beyond the threat of additional liability
to encourage generators to provide as complete information as possible. Once
waste has been transferred to a disposal facility, however, the generator is no
longer in the best position to monitor potentially harmful activities. Transfer
of liability at the time of transfer of waste would provide more efficient site
monitoring where, as the EU proposals recommend, operating waste facilities
are required to carry adequate insurance.
Currently, the insurance industry is unwilling to provide coverage for an
industry that has faced severe problems elsewhere and about which so little
is known. 334 This plan would not force insurers to take on sites with no
potential revenue, i.e., those closed under the superfund, and insurers would
therefore have an incentive to cover the remaining sites where risks accepted
would be adequately compensated. More important, technical information on
contamination gathered during the superfund phase of the program would help
insurers assess the environmental risks posed by waste sites.
Under this proposal, insurance providers would have an incentive to
police the insured. In addition, insurers would enjoy economies of scale
unavailable to generators, providing more efficient monitoring of waste
facilities. In other words, insurers' specialization in waste site coverage would
lead to a development of expertise that would not be possible in generating
firms for whom waste disposal is only a small part of a larger operation.
Some might object that a leaking waste site covered by a single insurer
represents poor risk spreading that could result in the bankruptcy of both the
site and the insurer, with no resources left for remediation. However, risk
calculation and spreading are the insurance industry's forte.
2. Sources of Revenue
Under the proposal, site owners would pay for their insurance premiums
by imposing surcharges on the waste coming through their gates. The level
of required coverage would initially be a matter of some debate, and might
need to be determined by the government. As cleanup of past contamination
333. Waste Liability Proposal, supra note 196, art. 7(1).
334. See HC, DRAFr DIRECTIVE, supra note 13, at xxxvi ("The American experience has had the
effect of giving pollution a 'dirty' name.., in insurance terms. .. ."); UK Report Calls for Strict
Liability in Waste Management, HAZNEWS, Jan. 1991, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Zevl File
("Lloyds of London ... identified the impact of environmental claims on the US insurance market as one
of the main reasons for resistance of insurers in the UK and Europe.").
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progresses under the superfund scheme, however, a better understanding of
the costs would allow a market-based calibration of risks and appropriate
premiums. Furthermore, individual site operators, perhaps in cooperation with
their insurers, would be allowed to decide how these charges should be
applied (e.g., by strict volumetric measure or by risks inherent in a given
waste stream) to reap additional efficiencies of the market. Should it be found
that the costs of cleanup are quite high, the resulting insurance premiums and
surcharges passed on to generators would better reflect the true costs of
disposal,335 providing further incentive for generators to minimize their
wastes.
3. Limitations
Private insurance is based on the predictability of future liability. The
insurance system proposed here would not be viable without sufficient
information about currently operating facilities, and it could not survive
another substantial modification of liability rules. The requirements of site
specific information and classification are addressed in the next section.
The need for stable liability rules highlights the importance of broad
consensus on the program's policy goals. The exercise of achieving this
consensus would protect the integrity of this insurance scheme in two regards.
First, where all affected parties' concerns are considered in determining key
aspects of the program, those determinations are more likely to withstand the
test of time. Second, should circumstances such as the discovery of previously
unknown environmental harms force a reconsideration of earlier
determinations, the mechanism for achieving consensus on how to proceed
would already exist. Despite uncertainties, this insurance scheme is therefore
viable.
D. Implementation
Waste site remediation programs must provide decisionmaking processes
for identifying both the sites that require remediation and the necessary level
of remediation.
1. Site Classification
In order to decide which sites require remediation, existing waste facilities
would be divided into three categories: "clean" sites eligible to continue
operations, "dirty" facilities clearly in need of prompt closure and
remediation, and the majority of sites in between those extremes. Because
public funds for remediation would be available only for sites eligible on the
335. This much is required by the Landfill Proposal, supra note 197, art. 16.
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date of the legislation, this classification process would play a key role in the
success of the proposed program. Sites mistakenly classified as clean and
eligible for continued operation would present an undesirable risk of
remediation cost to private insurers. For sites at either end of the spectrum,
classification would be relatively simple. For the sites in between the two
extremes, however, classification would involve extensive testing (likely to be
required under the EU Landfill Proposal), a thorough review of facility
records, and a degree of educated guesswork.
One approach to this problem would be to initiate a government
assessment program to determine the level of risk at each facility. The sites
found adequately protective of the environment would be allowed to continue
operations after acquiring appropriate insurance. At this point, insurers would
perform an evaluation to determine the terms of insurance. A process for
redressing government errors in the initial assessments would be required,
unless insurers performed independent assessments. Yet such independent
assessments would present an avoidable loss of efficiency and risk of conflicts
between government and industry determinations.
Alternatively, the government could limit its involvement to setting
minimum investigation and monitoring levels for insurers and giving the
insurance market a deadline to classify facilities. Two problems might arise
under this approach: insurers as a group could under- or overestimate facility
risks. Underestimation of risks is less likely to occur because of the U.S.
experience, which provides both ample warning to the British insurance
industry on the potential scope of the problem and empirical data on which
risk estimates can be based. In addition, because some sites will be deemed
uninsurable by any standard, some cleanup will be initiated immediately
through the superfund, providing real-time experience on British soil for the
further adjustment of risk assessment.
Because sites, once classified, would no longer be able to join the social
insurance program under the superfund, the costs of underestimating risks
would fall on the insurers and industry. To the extent that insurers are aware
of this possibility, their initial risk assessments would likely be overly
conservative, or too high. This could force the closure of too many sites,
leaving generating industries with inadequate capacity for waste disposal
needs.336 Such an error would be hard to correct, as sites denied insurance
would be closed and designated for remediation under the government-
administered superfund. Although a concrete solution to this problem is not
clear, Parliament should realize the nature of this hazard and provide a
336. To be sure, should widespread environmental damage prove to be the rule, even perfect risk
assessments could lead to a crisis in disposal capacity. The House of Commons expressed dismay at the
inadequacy of information available to forecast the impact of the Landfill Proposal on landfill capacity,
although industry representatives reported "an overall surplus of available space compared with the amount
of waste that we are expecting to put into that space." HC, DRAFT DIREcTrVE, supra note 13, at xx
(quoting National Association of Waste Disposal Contractors).
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mechanism for its redress. One approach would rank the sites excluded from
coverage to determine which are the least risky and provide for government-
industry negotiation to allow continued operation of sites closed because of
insurance industry skittishness rather than actual risk.
Once sites have been segregated, site operations could proceed according
to their classification. Facilities determined to be clean would proceed under
standard business operations, protected by required insurance coverage.
Facilities that are viable but not quite clean would have to implement required
remediation projects prior to reopening. Finally, sites determined to be too
contaminated would be closed and would await remediation under the
government's superfund program.
Because of the expenditure of public moneys in their remediation, the
disposition of the most contaminated sites would require additional regulation.
While owners of closed sites should not benefit from public funds in the
remediation of pollution from which they have already profited, outright
government appropriation of these properties might also be inequitable. In
addition, due to the greater level of private ownership of landfills in Britain
than on the Continent, this issue will have to be resolved in a way that does
not offend EU controls on government subsidies to private industry.
The dilemma could be solved by charging the site owner a fee equal to
the lesser of the increase in the value of his land after remediation or the
actual cost of remediation. Where remediation costs are less than the increase
in site value resulting from remediation, rational site-owners could be
expected to make those investments themselves. In effect, the government
would be acting as a fully compensated remediation contractor to the
landowner. In the more common case where remediation costs far exceed the
increase in land value, the landowner would essentially buy back remediated
land from the government. The landowner's advantage over other potential
bidders would be limited to the probably negligible value of the unremediated,
yet condemned, landfill site. Such an arrangement would allow the landowner
to retain ownership, yet prevent profit-taking at public expense.
Should this bifurcated plan work as envisioned, all existing sites would
eventually be operating under private insurance, and the British superfund
would be needed only for emergency projects or where site owners or their
insurers resist prompt action. At that time, the disposition of additional funds
will be left to the imagination of Parliament.
2. Selection of Remedies
The selection of appropriate remediation procedures is as critical to the
success of this system as adequate classification of facilities. Economically
rational selection of remedies requires consideration of possible future uses of
impaired land. A landfill set among factories clearly is not as great a concern
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as a site destined to become a schoolyard. A sensible determination of future
land uses requires an understanding of the concerns of the community in the
vicinity of the polluting site. Thus, remedy selection reinforces the importance
of public participation in setting both national cleanup goals and goals for
particular condemned sites. Recently proposed CERCLA amendments strongly
support this conclusion.337 Some form of local decisionmaking process
should be institutionalized to address this issue.
Certain aspects of remediation planning would be more efficient if
centralized. This would be particularly true during the publicly funded phase
of the program. Clearly only one superfund based on national revenues should
cover the whole program. This structure would avoid leaving districts with
shrinking industrial bases - and therefore shrinking revenues and typically
greater pollution problems - with inadequate resources to cover necessary
remediation.
The concentration of remediation resources also calls for a minimum level
of central technical decisionmaking capability. For example, in early phases,
sites would need to be ranked to assure that most serious problems are
addressed first. A central facility could act as a clearinghouse for technical
information as well. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution in the
Department of the Environment is the logical home for this facility. However,
HMIP, as it currently exists, is clearly not equal to this task. It lacks adequate
funding, staff, and the moral support of its parent organization for an
expansion of duties. These issues should be addressed by Parliament to ensure
competent and efficient program administration. The role of this facility would
diminish once the superfund program closes and privately funded operations
commence. Although a technical clearinghouse would always be needed, there
would be no need for a national prioritization of sites because most
remediation planning will be done locally.
At this point, authorities would have three options for initiating cleanup
similar to the EPA's options under CERCLA. They could proceed under the
prosecution, accommodation, and public works models. Several elements of
the program proposed here would lead to greater efficiency than exists under
the U.S. system. The reduction in PRPs from several hundred at some U.S.
sites to two in Britain - the site owner and insurer - would significantly
reduce transaction costs -regardless of the implementation model the
government chooses. In addition, because all sites would have substantial
histories of environmental monitoring, the authorities would have a clearer
picture in initiating remediation operations and setting cleanup priorities. The
publication of this information would allow further public input to sustain a
consensus on the program goals.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 304-306.
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VII. CONCLUSION
I have outlined a waste site remediation program to provide adequate
resources to address existing environmental impairment in the United
Kingdom. This plan fills gaps in recent EU proposals and anticipates the likely
consequences of those proposals on British law.
The EU debate on remediation of waste disposal sites is far from settled.
While the Green Paper suggests a "joint compensation fund" combined with
a liability system, the issue remains controversial and a detailed proposal has
yet to be developed. Unfortunately, the Europeans' awareness of the extreme
costs and relatively meager results of CERCLA in the United States has
resulted in little constructive discussion on the potential lessons of the U.S.
experience.
However, those lessons are relevant even within the constraints of both
the EU proposals and existing British conditions, and they can help to forge
a system more efficient than CERCLA to integrate the various policy goals
of waste site management. A bifurcated program of Superfund-style funding
for past harms and strict site-owner liability for future harms would remediate
orphan as well as claimed sites. It would provide incentives for industry to
minimize the use of hazardous chemicals and the generation of waste, and to
report previously unregistered contaminated sites. Appropriately structured,
such a scheme would encourage the private sector to police waste sites in an
efficient manner, and it would avoid many of the transaction costs that plague
CERCLA.
Whatever form the EU and British rules finally take, some system will
inevitably be negotiated, legislated, and enacted in the coming years. The
tremendous expenses and wide range of interests at stake in waste site
remediation guarantee that the solution will be expansively studied, debated,
and analyzed. Perhaps then research on both sides of the Atlantic will provide
the silver bullet to put the CERCLA werewolf to rest.
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